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NOTES ON THE RELIANCE INTEREST
Robert Birmingham*
The topic is Contract Damages. The interests are defined by how we
protect them. Imagine a breaching promisor. We protect the reliance
interest of the promisee by requiring the promisor to put her in a position as
good as she would have been in had the parties not contracted. The other
interests are the restitution interest, which we protect by requiring the
promisor to give back what the promisee has given him; and the expectation
interest, which we protect by requiring the promisor to put the promisee in a
position as good as she would have been in had he kept his promise. In a
sense the reliance interest is intermediate between the other two interests. A
promisee might rely otherwise than by giving the promisor what a restitu-
tionary remedy will make him give back, and she enters a contract expect-
ing to be better off by doing this than she would be by not doing it (unless
she would expect, if she did not enter this contract, to enter a contract
similar to it). The definitions of the interests are by Fuller but the second
Restatement adopts them.
My paper is mainly loosely connected reviews of two other papers about
the reliance interest. I talk in Part I about The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, by Fuller and Perdue. I This paper defined the interests and urged
us to attend particularly to the reliance interest. Goetz and Scott, who wrote
the other paper, invite us to extract from The Reliance Interest the insight
that "reliance is the organizing principle that supports all contractual
obligation." 2 The Reliance Interest is our most significant article on con-
tract law. (We rightly resist adding 'alas', as in Gide's reply "Hugo-
helas!" to the question 'Who was the greatest poet of the nineteenth
century?') Macneil speculates that The Reliance Interest "may well have
had more influence in changing American contract jurisprudence in the
past 40 years than any other single article or book." 3 The competition is
formidable. Conceivably Macneil discounts Corbin's treatise on the ground
that its influence is an instance of backward causation. Corbin published it
late in his career (1950-51), long after he had established its ideas.4
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.
1. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (Pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373
(1936-37) [hereinafter cited in the text as The Reliance Interest].
2. Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J.
1261, 1291 n.61 (1980) [hereinafter cited in the text as Enforcing Promises].
3. I. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 98
(2d ed. 1978).
4. Gilmore called Fuller's article "remarkable." G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 56 (1974).
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I talk in Part II about Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, by Goetz and Scott. Goetz and Scott consciously build on
Fuller's idea but they disregard the ethical foundation of it in a way I will
discuss. They defend the thesis they attribute to Fuller: protecting the
reliance interest is the objective of contract law. Goetz and Scott are
methodologically more sophisticated than Fuller. Where Fuller applied
Aristotelian philosophy and folk economics they use indifference curves.5
Hudec remarks of The Reliance Interest that its "analysis has served a
generation of contracts scholars as a model of how to think about contract
law generally" 6 It certainly has done this but the generation of contracts
scholars is not quite the current one.
This is a critical study, its affirmative aspect largely implicit. But Parts I
and II share two theses (A and B)-or a weak and a strong form of one
thesis. A: The expectation interest counts too. Evidently this is true but it
takes through Part II to bring it out. B: Only the expectation interest counts.
B is maybe less interesting because it turns on taxonomy (we identify a
transaction as uncontractual if we purposely protect reliance on it). But the
law is prettier if B is true. To get clear about A/B, recast the thesis Enforcing
Promises attributes to Fuller and defends as C: Only the reliance interest
counts.7 Apparently then 'counts' is interchangeable with 'is an organizing
principle of contract law', 'is an objective of contract law', etc. Nothing is
novel about A and B. Goetz and Scott are trying to refute A by asserting C
and they think Fuller was too. Perhaps; but by a better reading Fuller was
more circumspect and tried rather to refute B by arguingfor the other side
of A: The reliance interest counts too. E.g., Fuller breaks off advocating the
reliance interest to tell us the expectation interest in charitable contributions
is rightly protected without regard to the promise having been relied on.
Part I has two jobs: be friendly to A/B; explain why Fuller was not more
so. The problem was the reliance interest was theoretically too central to
Fuller's analysis to be protected most of the time by tort law. So he did not
make "the assumption, so frequently made, that any liability explicitly
directed toward the reimbursement of reliance must rest on 'tort' rather than
'contract'. "8 The reliance interest was too central to Fuller's analysis for two
reasons. He was unequipped to work out the economics of the expectation
interest-he invoked Aristotle instead of Marshall-so if deprived of the
reliance interest he would have had no theory. Coincidentally Williston and
But he called Corbin's treatise "the greatest law book ever written." Id. at 57. Generally. Gilmore
graciously said that things are better than they are.
5. See generally Samuelson, Economics in a Golden Age: A Personal Memtoir in PAUL SAMUELSON
AND MODERN ECONOlic THEORY 1, 6 (E. Brown & R. Solow eds. 1983).
6. Hudec, Restating the "'Reliance Interest," 67 CORNELL L. REV. 704. 733 (1982).
7. Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 1291 n.61. 1321-22.
8. Fuller & Perdue. supra note 1, at 409.
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Corbin in their compromise over section 90 of the Restatement corrupted
his data base so he started off calling too many promises 'contracts' .9
I have organized Part I like this. Part IA is an annotated outline of Fuller's
data. I start here because Fuller's paper is classically inductive, i.e., Fuller
argued that the cases categorized his way make more sense. The annota-
tions suggest this is anyway not self-evidently so. Parts IB and IC respec-
tively address promises bargained for and gratuitous promises. Fuller
taught us the expectation interest in bargained-for promises gets protected
in the course of protecting the reliance interest. Part IB says the dependency
goes the other way. Part IC begins with Gilmore's story of Corbin's enthusi-
astic and Williston's grudging invention of Restatement section 90, then
assimilates this section to tort law. Part ID suggests that Fuller discounted
the expectation interest because his reading Aristotle left him unprepared to
get the point of protecting it.
The ideas in Part I are big (and vague). One gets embarrassed by them.
Part II somewhat redemptively makes mostly narrow technical points. The
Reliance Interest was published in 1936; Enforcing Promises in 1980. That
the forty-four years intervening have made a methodological difference to
scholarship partly explains the difference in levels of the analyses.
The technical analysis is largely to the effect that Goetz and Scott get
wrong results from or by interpreting their geometry. Or better, Goetz and
Scott get right results but not enough of them. To correct what they say, I use
what Goetz has published elsewhere, but has applied differently' 10 So in a
way I am redirecting their insights, not having new ones. But our dif-
ferences, despite-being technical, are worth inquiring into, albeit everybody
has met more exciting arguments. Benefit side: Enforcing Promises
depends on being technically right. Thesis C-that only the reliance
interest counts-is sensible according to its self-imposed criterion only if
protecting just the reliance interest (with some latitude about what counts as
this interest) provides an economic optimum. Goetz and Scott teach us to
calculate this interest a new and excellent way. If my analysis is right,
however, protecting the interest calculated this way is sub-optimal.
Perspective is also important. For instance, Whitehead reminds us:
"After all, even during the worst period of the decline of Rome the
barbarians were enjoying themselves."" The perspective from which
Enforcing Promises is wrong (if it is wrong)-that of the theory of eco-
nomic policy-is itself valuable.
Part IIA derives beneficial and detrimental reliances following Goetz and
Scott. Part IIB explains their optimal damage rule based on these reliances.
9. Id. at 63-66.
10. C. GoErz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 299-303 (1984).
11. A. WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS 7 (1933).
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Goetz and Scott celebrate the equivalence of this rule and the Hand test in
tort law. Part IIC finds the rules governing intentional tort, not negligent
tort, more nearly equivalent to the optimal damage rule. Part IIC also
discusses how Goetz and Scott use 'reliance' in a way related only ten-
uously to Fuller's use of it. Part lID mostly criticizes the rule of Enforcing
Promises as economically sub-optimal. It argues that if we extend what
Goetz and Scott say, if we take it as true and investigate the consequences of
it, then we end up reinventing contract pretty much as we have it, not as they
want it to be. There is something of Russell's argument against ordinary-
language physics here: 'If it is true it is false, therefore it is false'.
We should judge a damage rule for breach of contract by whether it
performs three functions well or badly: compensates the promisee; gets the
number of promises made right; and gets the number of promises kept right.
The first function mattered most to Fuller; Goetz and Scott worry about the
second; I am interested in the third. Parts IIC and liD respectively talk about
accomplishing (or failing to accomplish) the first two and then simul-
taneously all three of the functions.
Finally, which of A/B/C is best matters although the question is abstract.
This area of contract law has been unstable since Fuller published. Fuller
criticized the parts of the first Restatement about remedies effectively
enough that not much of them survives. The Restatement as it is currently
written repentantly embraces Fuller's catalogue of interests, likewise his
permissive attitude toward protecting them. 12 It is (perhaps consequently)
usually unable to tell judges what to do. This kind of change in the current
Restatement has been hailed as a desirable shift from rules to standards' 3
but is still an evil thing.
I. FULLER AND PERDUE
A.
Fuller's thesis (stated so as to equivocate between B/C): There is a
reliance interest distinct from the expectation and restitution interests.
Courts do protect it some and ought to protect it more. Fuller came this close
to C taken independently of B: "We might easily base the whole law of
contracts on a fundamental premise that only those promises which have
been relied on will be enforced. As the chief exception to this principle we
12. See R. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER 133 (1984).
13. See generally Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 CORNELL
L. REv. 785 (1982).
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should have to list the bilateral business agreement." 14 The modal operator
'might' makes a difference. Also, the class of contracts except the bilateral
business contract is like the class of divine beings except God.
The thesis has really only two parts. Fuller's existence claim ('there is
. . ') depends on what courts have done or should be doing. The 'or'
accomodates alternative descriptive and normative readings of Fuller's
thesis. We posit interests only if they explain things. Fuller argued that we
can make sense of the pattern of decided cases and say something useful
about how undecided cases should be decided by positing a reliance
interest. For B/C to work requires that courts protect the reliance interest as
such. The impact of 'as such' is reasonably evident intuitively although
tricky to articulate. (Analogously: "An iron filing can be said to respond to
a green magnet as a magnet"; however, the filing "clearly" does not
"respond to the magnet as green, for it would respond in the same way if the
magnet were of any other color." 15) Examples: Contract law protects not as
such, but merely incidentally, fractions of the expectation interest, or
protected interests of persons whose names begin with 'A', etc. Nev-
ertheless, it is not exactly that the reliance interest needs to be protected
under a particular description: e.g., 'the reliance interest'. Part of what
made The Reliance Interest outstanding is that the authors were (in some
sense) locating a reliance interest for the judges, not just reporting that the
judges already had found it.
We may identify two separable uses of the reliance interest. A court may
decide to give relief because a promisee has relied but determine the
quantity of this relief independently of the reliance. A court may decide to
give relief independently of the reliance but determine the quantity of this
relief by the quantity of the reliance. As does Fuller,16 we will refer to the
uses in terms of 'motive' and 'measure' of recovery respectively. The two
uses have a logical affinity for each other, so something is unresolved if a
court employs one without the other. Fuller was fortunate to get either in his
illustrative cases.
First, we must inspect the evidence The Reliance Interest adduces for
there being a reliance interest or for its being protected. The article was
published in two parts (together the parts run over ninety pages). Part 1
supplies most of Fuller's theory. Part 2 is more than an appendix of case law
supporting the argument of part 1. Nevertheless it has that feel. It assembles
seven categories of what it calls "situations in which judicial intervention
has been (or in our opinion, should be) limited to a protection of what we
14. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 70.
15. Sellars, Mental Events, 39 PHIL. STUD. 325, 335 (1981).
16. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 66-71.
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have called the reliance interest." 17 In Part IA of this article I briefly review
the categories using Fuller's captions for them. Fuller was young and
hungry when he wrote The Reliance Interest. This is evident in the richness
of the material in the categories. I am going to try to indicate this richness
while being attentive to my own expository pace.
The order of the categories turns out to be significant. This is: 1)
expectancies uncertain; 2) Flureau v. Thornhill, etc.; 3) frustration; 4)
Statute of Frauds; 5) family agreements; 6) section 90; 7) deceit. The order
goes from the least to the most questionably contractual. Category I is
about promises belonging to ordinary bargains; category 7 about relied-on
nonpromises.
Cases Where the Requirement of "Certainty" Excludes Damages
Measured by the Expectation Interest
One cannot get one's expectation interest protected if one cannot estab-
lish it. This seems to be about the burden of proof. And where one cannot
establish one's expectation interest, if one can establish one's reliance
interest one can get that protected, given the promisor's breach, etc. This
much seems straightforward. This use of the reliance interest appears
merely mensural. I suggest later it is not even fully that.
Fuller said more is going on. The reliance recovery is usually between the
expectation recovery and nothing. Courts require certainty where they think
a plaintiff would otherwise get too much. In that situation, she gets reliance
damages, i.e., less. Then, a use of the rule requiring certainty is to reach a
result desired for other reasons than those on which it, by its terms,
depends. Fuller said the rule is, in this respect, similar to the rule of Hadley
v. Baxendale except that it can be used when the promisee has told the
promisor how she is going to be hurt. This is plausible-we all think it
true-but to establish it we would have to assess situations in cases by the
certainty and excessiveness of the expectation interests in the promises and
calculate which characteristic better predicted results. The terms 'certainty'
and 'excessiveness' have not been authoritatively defined. Fuller did not do
this, nor has anybody else done it.
It is hard to evaluate what Fuller said here. Underlying his position is the
legal realistic premise that judges manipulate doctrine to get a result they
want. Well of course they do. And Fuller should not be blamed just for
sharing the attitudes and forms of argument of his day. Imagine, though, we
buy everything Fuller said. All we get is a reason to protect what we might
call the 'modest expectation interest'. Hadley similarly wants to protect
17. Id. at 373.
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expectation interests selectively. The upshot is that judges by requiring
certainty are protecting the reliance interest only incidentally-i.e., pro-
tecting it because it is intermediate and available.
Fuller told us that requiring certainty also results from "a desire for an
easily administered rule"; and where this "impulse is the controlling one,
the reliance interest is often employed as a surrogate for the expectation
interest." 18 Many rules are easily administered: e.g., 'Pick the taller liti-
gant'. Thus, saying just this does not explain anything. But if one says a bit
more, one gets a good doctrinal explanation for using the reliance interest in
these situations. I do this in Part IB.
Cases Where Damages Measured by the Expectancy Would Impose an
Undue Burden on the Promisor
These cases mostly follow Flureau v. Thornhill, 19 by which the vendor of
land need not compensate his vendee for loss of her expectancy if he cannot
make out title, but has tried. The 'undue burden' language here is mislead-
ing: the burden is in general not undue, and "the life of the [rule] has not
been logic: it has been experience. "20 Not just the restitution interest, but
the reliance interest too, is protected under Flureau. But the case is old; the
rule has always been a minority position in America; and it is dying out.
There is something else too. A lot of what I am going to say turns on
keeping separate promises that are parts of bargains (promises supported by
consideration-i.e., falling under Restatement section 75) and other prom-
ises (mainly under section 90). But 'bargain' is going to refer ideally to
exchanges of widgets for money-nobody gets upset about losing widgets.
A sale of land in eighteenth-century England evidently was by bargain. But
the bargain was too distant from paradigmatic bargain, i.e., it was sullied by
noneconomic concerns, because land was special. It was too closely con-
nected to status. A family was defined by its land. Thus Blackstone (a judge
in Flureau, and its reporter) wrote Book II of the Commentaries as he did.
Flureau itself looks commercial. Nevertheless it was decided against a
background of solicitude for real property. This solicitude conceivably
infected its results.
Cases Where Performance of the Contract is Interfered with by External
Circumstances
These cases are, most importantly, the impossibility/frustration cases.
Fuller says there are "no American or English cases expressly recognizing a
18. Id. at 376.
19. 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (C.P. 1776).
20. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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recovery" by a party to a frustrated contract "measured by the reliance
interest"--but that there should be. 2' Meanwhile, he finds the reliance
interest covertly recognized. I.e., there is "much reason to suspect that in
some" frustration cases "the reliance interest has received protection under
an alias ['restitution']. '22 So the court may invent something the promisor
receives that is equivalent in value to what the promisee gives up.
Fuller's language here is argumentative: " . . . reasonable to suppose
that the primary object of the court . . . was to reimburse the plaintiff for
his reliance on the contract"; " ... cannot remove a suspicion that their
decision was influenced predominantly by the desire to reimburse a plain-
tiff who had made expenditures in reliance"; etc. 23 Fuller insightfully
suggests that reliance gets called 'restitution', but otherwise misses what is
going on.
By the time the parties get to court, there is no contract. (This is a formal
result, and one's impulse is to apologize for it; occasionally though, formal
results do not mislead.) Hypothetically, neither promisor nor promisee has
done anything wrong. They ordinarily have a joint loss relative to where
they would have been had they not contracted. This loss must come from
reliance on the contract by one or both the parties. 'Let the loss lie where it
falls' does not have much appeal; the intuitively just disposition is Sol-
omon's: divide the loss. A student note quoted in the 1981 edition (by
Eisenberg) of Fuller's casebook tells us to do just this: "If reliance loss is
left where it falls, who incurs the loss and how much is incurred are as
fortuitously unfortunate as the fact that the contract cannot be performed";
"since the fortuity of actual reliance expenditures provides no generally
applicable guides for the placement of loss, it seems fairest to split loss
according to equal innocence." '24
Contracts Imperfect in Expression or in Legal Effect
These are mainly contracts falling within the Statute of Frauds. We do not
protect the expectation interest; if we did, the Statute would accomplish
nothing. We protect the restitution interest as a matter of course; in formal
terms actions for restitution are not on the contract, albeit the existence of a
contract is what makes it right to require that what has been given be given
back. Fuller would like us to protect the reliance interest too. A few cases do
this; of course a few cases do anything.
21. Fuller & Perdue, supra note I, at 380.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 381-82.
24. Note, Apportioning Loss After Discharge of a Burdensome Contract: A Statutory Solution, 69
YALE L.J. 1054, 1060 (1960), quoted in L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 875, 876
(4th ed. 1981).
224
Vol. 60:217, 1985
Notes on the Reliance Interest
Fuller agrees most cases manifestly in point go the other way. Probably
proportionately more of them went that way then than now. But he asks us to
consider cases other than those "in which the problem is made explicit." 25
i.e., part performance takes a contract out of the Statute. We usually say the
evidence of the contract generated by part performance makes fraud,
unlikely. Fuller says: "What this notion means in its broadest form is simply
that when an oral contract has been seriously relied on, it becomes enforce-
able." 26 To adjudicate between these competing justifications, we would
need to find a case where reliance was significant but not evidentiary (if this
is logically possible) and consider how it came out. Anyway (as Fuller
recognizes), when the contract becomes enforceable, the court protects the
expectation interest. He explains that the court is trying to protect the
reliance interest, but protects it awkwardly. Here too he indicates that, in
other circumstances, where there is not part performance, courts, although
purporting only to protect the restitution interest, nevertheless protect the
reliance interest by defining 'benefit' broadly.
Fuller's ideas are good but it is hard to get our intuitions around them. If
we suppose the contract was made, that is, if the issue is nakedly whether or
not to apply the Statute of Frauds, we try to figure out how not to. What
stops us at protecting the restitution interest or, less probably, the reliance
interest, is not that we think the promisee deserves only this. We simply do
not see our way clear doctrinally to give her more. The inclination to protect
the reliance interest is parasitic on the inclination to protect the expectation
interest, as far as desert, as distinct from doctrine, goes.
Fuller appears here to argue against himself. He wants the reliance
interest to get protected as part of contract law, but comprehends what keeps
it from getting protected at all in the vicinity of the Statute of Frauds is just
its being taken as contractual. Symptomatically, if somewhat desperately,
he celebrates the Connecticut court's having "found no difficulty, and
apparently experienced nojuristic pain, in conceiving of" a suit for reliance
damages "as based on a rescission of the contract." 27 The tension abates if
by talking reliance one is talking tort.
Bargains Relating to a Subject Matter Noncommercial in Nature
Thus the nonparadigmatic (noncommercial) bargains. Frequently it is
touch and go whether a court will find a contract (Hamer v. Sidway28) or not
25. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 390.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 388.
28. 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891).
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(Balfour v. Balfour 29). When nevertheless it does, it usually protects the
expectation interest. Fuller claimed a court finds a contract and thus protects
the expectation interest depending on whether the promisee has relied on
the promise.
We might prove this claim by citing pairs of similar promises, one
member relied on and enforced, the other unrelied on and unenforced.
Fuller cites just one case: Hamer. As Fuller interprets it, the nephew
"denied himself" alcohol, nicotine, etc. "in reliance on a promise." 30 One
must read 'denied' as 'did not use' and 'in reliance on' as 'knowing about'.
The report of the case contains nothing indicating the plaintiff behaved
differently than he would have if the uncle had not promised. The defendant
tried to argue that the plaintiff had been benefited by behaving well, so the
reliance at least was not detrimental; but the court would not let him.
I think it is better to look at these cases as deciding whether a contract or
something else is going on, not whether reliance or expectation damages
should be given for breaking a conceded contract. The contexts are pre-
dominantly familial; Fuller says elsewhere, "marital problems qualify on
all counts for mediational [i.e., among other things, not contractual]
solution. ",31
The Measure of Recovery under Section 90 of the Restatement
The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages mostly promotes the reliance
interest. The point of section 90 is to premise recovery on reliance, thus it
starts off talking motive. But the (original) Restatement measured recovery
by the expectation interest. We expect Fuller to advocate that reliance be the
measure of recovery too. However, he was curiously reticent here. He said
that where "there is a discrepancy between" the expectation and the
reliance interests "a court would wisely choose in many situations to
protect the expectation interest. ", 32 Then he added that we should recognize
"that the remedy must be adapted to the needs of the particular situation. ,,33
Fuller said some of what we want him to say in his Part 1 but this is pretty
mild stuff. Probably it seems so retrospectively partly because of the impact
of The Reliance Interest.
Liability for Misrepresentation
The thesis of Part I stated in terms of Fuller's categories 1 through 7 is
this. Going from I to 7 is like watching a tadpole turn into a frog. If we have
29. 11919] 2 K.B. 571 (C.A.).
30. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 389.
31. Fuller. Mediation-its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305. 330 (1971).
32. Fuller & Perdue, supra note I. at 405.
33. Id.
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a tadpole at 1 and a frog at 7 we wonder about 5. Correspondingly we label
what is happening legally 'contract' at 1 and 'tort' at 7. Fuller finished
saying 'contract' only with 6. Tort talk should start at 3.
A contract is at least a live promise. Categories 7, 3, and 4 are about
nonpromises, former promises, and unenforceable promises respectively
Category 5 is about live promises that are sometimes contractual (to this
extent we must equivocate). Category 6 differs from 7 only gram-
matically-i.e., insufficiently to motivate classifying them separately at
law.
It is a mistake to think we may label a legal entity 'contract' or 'tort'
indifferently, as we may label a baby, e.g., 'Elizabeth' without a lot
depending on the label. Instead, 'contract' ties us into one pattern of
inferences and 'tort' into another. We next say 'consideration' instead of
'due care', etc. Fuller's difficulty in category 4 makes this clear.
Fuller spoke of his categories as containing cases in which only the
reliance interest is or should be protected. The categoiies evidently contain
other cases too. Also 'or' here is distant from 'and'. Courts do not invaria-
bly protect the reliance interest when Fuller thinks they should. (That they
do not is fine-Fuller was often explaining why law is the way it is; but he
also wanted parts of it changed.) And occasionally-e.g., perhaps with the
rule from Flureau-they protect it when he is not sure they should.
B.
We will try to get some mileage out of Security Stove & Manufacturing
Co. v. American Railway Express Co.,34 hardly the latest thing. The
defendant broke its promise to deliver the plaintiffs gas furnace to Atlantic
City to be exhibited at the American Gas Association Convention. The
plaintiff intended to display, not sell, the particular furnace token it shipped.
Profit would have come by increased sales and was uncertain. If exhibited,
the furnace might have malfunctioned so the plaintiff would have sold fewer
furnaces than it actually did. Or the plaintiff might have sold every furnace
it could manufacture anyway.
With respect to the broken promise, the plaintiff sought reliance damages
or what would have been called 'reliance damages' prior to Goetz and Scott.
The defendant argued the plaintiff should get expectation damages or
nothing (besides shipping charges refunded). The defendant complained
the plaintiff was "endeavoring to achieve a return of the status quo in a suit
34. 227 Mo. App. 175, 51 S.W.2d 572 (1932). The name of the plaintiff in the state reporter is
'Security Store' etc.
227
Washington Law Review
based on a breach of contract," thereby committing a conceptual error that
the defendant invited the court not to endorse. 35 The defendant said the
plaintiff was "trying to recover what he would have had, had there never
been any contract of shipment," rather than correctly "seeking to recover
what he would have had, had the contract not been broken. ",36 Apparently,
the defendant put squarely before the court the choice between protecting
the expectation interest and protecting the reliance interest.
The court awarded reliance damages. The plaintiff had rented a booth at
the convention. It had transported a workman and its president to Atlantic
City and back and had maintained them there throughout the convention,
waiting respectively to assemble the furnace and to point to it. That the
workman and the president had a good time in Atlantic City did not benefit
the plaintiff. Giving out-of-pocket expenses as reliance damages, as the
court did, is ordinary. But it will look bad by Part II. I will call cases like
Security Stove where profit is uncertain 'type I reliance cases'.
The usual way we read Security Stove is illustrated by Murray's classify-
ing the case under "The Protection of the Reliance Interest." 37 We get:
Hypothesis I (conventional wisdom): The court in type I reliance cases
protects the reliance interest as such.
There are a couple of problems that disturb us early on about hypothesis 1.
The first problem is that the language of the court (by Bland, J.) seems
slightly incongruent with hypothesis 1. The court was unhappy giving
reliance damages, but could not give expectation damages or could not do
this directly. It admitted the defendant got "the general rule" of damages
right, but said this rule is not "inconsistent with the holdings that, in some
instances, the injured party may recover expenses." 38 We should expect
more of this consistency than that the general rule is not general enough to
apply here. Taken more vigorously, 'consistent' suggests the rules are
related. The court professed to award the damages it did lest the plaintiff
"be deprived of any substantial compensation for its loss." 39 A court
doctrinally at ease does not talk this way.
The second problem with hypothesis 1 is that Security Stove's damages
are only implausibly reliance damages. In the introduction we defined
reliance damages as putting the nonbreaching party where she would have
been had the parties not contracted. Consider then the counterfactual: 'had
the parties not contracted'. Imagine that Security Stove had not contracted
35. Id. at 182, 51 S.W.2d at 576.
36. Id.
37. J. MURRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 19 (3d ed. 1983).
38. 227 Mo. App. at 182, 51 S.W.2d at 576.
39. Id. at 184, 51 S.W.2d at 577.
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with American Railway Express Company (A). It would have not just stayed
home but it would have contracted with another carrier (B). If B would have
delivered the furnace on time, and A was required-to, the consequents of the
counterfactuals for reliance damages and expectation damages are identical
except for the name of the carrier, ' . . . the furnace parts would have
arrived on time, delivered by _', the blank to be filled by 'A' or 'B'. In
Security Stove, reliance and expectation damages are identical and include
lost profits because the plaintiff would have obtained these had the furnace
been delivered on time regardless of who delivered it. Consequently, the
court by giving expenses protected neither interest exactly
There is a terminological awkwardness because we naturally apply the
phrase 'reliance damages' to recoveries calculated counterfactually and to
recoveries calculated by expenditure and these may diverge. How we use
'reliance damages' in each instance (and the distinction matters) will be
indicated whenever its usage is not clear from the context.
It is worth entertaining a different reading of Security Stove:
Hypothesis 2: Courts in type I reliance cases award the expectation interest as
best they can.
We would support hypothesis 2 by citing what troubles us about Security
Stove (its weak endorsement of reliance damages and then its not giving
them) and arguing: The court's "fundamental premise" 40 is that contract
law should protect the expectation interest. The court could have calculated
damages many ways. It could have given Security Stove the sum of the ages
of its president's children plus $1000, etc. But it wanted not to be arbitrary.
The court was not arbitrary if (whatever it recognized as) the reliance
interest is related to the expectation interest so that by awarding the first, it
awarded approximately the second.
Security Stove is perfectly compatible with both hypotheses. We
ordinarily test competing hypotheses by finding contexts where their con-
sequences diverge. Here, the consequences diverge in two kinds of cases.
Paradigmatically, L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co. 41 is the first
kind. Armstrong contracted with Albert to buy four refiners-machines to
recondition old rubber-and constructed foundations for them. Albert
delivered two of the machines late. Armstrong justifiably rejected all four
and sought the cost of the foundations. The difficulty in Albert was not that
profits were uncertain as they were in Security Stove. Armstrong we
imagine could calculate its profits too well. World War II was winding
down; nobody wanted reconditioned old rubber; the profits would have
been negative.
40. See supra text accompanying note 14.
41. 178 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1949).
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Learned Hand, deciding Albert, observed the case law was inconsistent.
But Fuller's The Reliance Interest endorsed what Hand called a "very
simple formula": "We will not in a suit for reimbursement for losses
incurred in reliance on a contract knowingly put [the relying promisee] in a
better position than he would have occupied had the contract been fully
performed." ' 42 Hand liked this. "On principle," Hand concluded, "the
proper solution would seem to be that the promisee may recover his outlay
in preparation for the performance, subject to the privilege of the promisor
to reduce it by as much as he can show that the promisee would have lost, if
the contract had been performed. '43 I will call cases like Albert, charac-
terized by the plaintiff's declining to prove profits because there are losses,
'type I reliance cases'.
Fuller recognized type I reliance cases by his category 1-contracts
having uncertain expectancies. He lacked a category corresponding to type
II reliance-evidently because courts do not, and he believed they should
not, give reliance damages in type II cases. After all, it was Fuller's formula
that Hand liked. Types I and II have in common that the promisee in a
paradigmatic bargaining context has requested reliance damages. They are
unique or nearly unique in this. Courts are in the business of protecting the
expectation interest in promises belonging to bargains if they can identify it
(type I problem). If both interests are identified, a promisee would ask a
court to protect the reliance interest instead of the expectation interest only
if the reliance interest is larger (type II problem).
I added the optional 'nearly' before 'unique' in the preceding paragraph
to account for a response to the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale.44 A court does
not protect unnatural and unanticipated parts of the expectation interest. A
promisee might instead seek reliance damages. In Hadley itself we would
calculate damages indifferently using expectation or reliance-we imagine
if Hadley had not contracted with Pickford, he would have shipped the shaft
by another carrier expected to be equally fast. Section 90 says the promisor
must reasonably expect the promise to be relied on. Here, 'reasonably'
reads the rule in Hadley to be that a promisee cannot do better than recover
her expectation interest, recalculated to exclude unnatural and unantici-
pated losses.
The law might have been that the reliance and the expectation interests
are unconnected. Then a promisee could sue on either independently. The
holdings (although not always the dicta) of type I reliance cases are
42. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 79 (emphasis omitted).
43. 178 E2d at 189. Hudec says Judge Hand in Albert denied other claims for more substantial
reliance damages, because Judge Hand judged that plaintiff would have lost had defendant performed.
Hudec, supra note 6, at 728-30.
44. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 343, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 146(1854).
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consistent with the law being this way. Nevertheless, type II cases indicate
that the law is not (in bargaining contexts). By these cases, a court gives a
promisee only her expectation interest when both interests have been
proven. Hand's rule clarifies Fuller's rule by having its result depend on the
burden of proof (this dependence is probably implicit in Fuller's 'know-
ingly'). The promisee makes out a prima facie case for recovering her
reliance interest (sometimes understood as her expenditures) by proving
this loss. The promisor may then reduce this recovery by the amount that he
can prove her expectation interest falls short of her reliance interest so
understood. Briefly, if anybody proves the expectation interest, the prom-
isee gets it exclusively
We attend again to the counterfactual aspects of the definitions of the
interests. In type I reliance cases, the court protects the expectation interest
indirectly. A promisee mostly proves her expectation interest directly: 'If Y
had delivered the widgets under the contract, I would have had them for
___dollars less'. But pretend her expectancy is uncertain so she cannot do
this. She may still prove it indirectly by showing how much she has relied:
'If I had not contracted with Y, I would not have built this widget-using
machine'. We contract expecting to be at least as well off as if we had not
contracted, the argument goes. (Fuller appreciated this: "Plainly it is this
divergence between the cost of giving and the gain realized by receiving
that makes possible the reciprocal advantages that can result from a prop-
erly negotiated exchange. "45) Our reliance loss consequently gives the
minimum gain we expect. We might be disappointed of course. But it is up
to the promisor-this being only a matter of the burden of proof-to show
we would have been.
The second kind of case by which we can compare hypotheses 1 and 2
includes Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey46 and Anglia Television Ltd.
v. Reed.47 These cases go oppositely, so we support either hypothesis by
picking sides. I have never liked Dempsey. Dempsey broke his promise to
fight and the Club sought its expenses. The court decided it could not
recover those incurred before it contracted with Dempsey because it could
not, at that time, reasonably have been relying on the contract. So it was
pretty obviously protecting the reliance interest. Dempsey is like a type I
reliance case because profits are uncertain. But in Dempsey, or Dempsey
unadulterated, there is no reliance, the plaintiffs having spent what they
spent before contracting.
In Anglia, Anglia contracted with Reed for the latter to act in its filmed
play. Reed repudiated (apparently) a day later. Anglia did not contract with
45. Fuller, supra note 31, at 317.
46. 265 III. App. 542 (1932).
47. [1971] 3 All E.R. 690 (C.A.).
Washington Law Review
another actor and did not produce the play. It could not prove its profits and
consequently claimed for what the court called 'wasted expenditure'. Lord
Denning gave expenditures wasted both after and before contracting, all
expenditures "as would reasonably be in the contemplation of the parties as
likely to be wasted if the contract was broken." 48
Murray, not a hero here, classifies Anglia with Security Stove under "The
Protection of the Reliance Interest." ' 49 This appears wrong. Given De-
nning's reasoning, the result would have been insensitive to Reed's having
repudiated anytime, regardless of how short, after agreement. But then we
get an unadulterated case of no reliance. Denning's term 'contemplation of
the parties' 50 is expectation measure talk. The brief Hadley opinion uses
forms of 'contemplate' five times. Denning put Anglia where it would have
been had Reed performed the contract, not where it would have been had
Anglia and Reed not contracted. That is, Denning did this to the extent
Anglia's proof permitted it: as did Bland in Security Stove, Denning had to
estimate Anglia's expectation from its expenditures. Anglia is une-
quivocally a case in which the court chose the expectation measure over the
reliance measure where this choice mattered not just doctrinally but to the
result.
That with promises bargained for the reliance recovery is just a surrogate
for the expectation recovery was a not quite clearly articulated premise of
the remedial part of the first Restatement. The remedies it endorsed were
listed in section 326 and included only "compensation for injury," specific
performance, and restitution. 51 According to section 329, a promisee was
compensated when he received "the net amount of the losses caused and
gains prevented by the defendant's breach. "52 Evidently 'compensation'
was defined in terms of the expectation interest. Fuller told us section 333,
"When Damages May Be Measured by Expenditures in Part Performance,"
is opaque to "one uninitiated in the systematics of the Restatement." 53 The
section seems not that bad. A judgment for expenditures, it taught us, "is a
judgment for a portion of the value promised by the defendant, the receipt of
which by the plaintiff is prevented by the breach." 54 (Fuller disparaged this
as "tendentious. "55) And with 'he' referring to the promisee, it instructed
us, "[s]ince in the usual case he is entitled to expenditure plus profits, his
48. Id. at 692.
49. J. MURRAY, supra note 37, at 543.
50. Anglia, 3 All E.R. at 692 (quoting Lloyd v. Stanbury, [19711 2 All E.R. 267, 276 (Ch. 1970)).
51. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 326 (1932).
52. Id. § 329.
53. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 90.
54. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 333 comment a (1932).
55. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 90.
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inability to prove profits should not deprive him of his right to the proved
expenditure .... "56
I think Fuller misinterpreted section 333. At least he read it a way that
unnecessarily provoked trouble. He protested that the section discriminated
between kinds of expenditures, implying that expenditures may not be
recovered if they are the wrong kind, i.e., are not "made in performing...
or preparing to perform" a contract.57 We have rather been reading it to
relate to the reason- we protect the reliance interest-that it is or is not
included in the expectation interest. Read this way there is not the implica-
tion he disliked.
C.
Comment d to section 90 of the second Restatement announces that a
"promise binding under this section is a contract. '58 This is a strange thing
for the Restatement to say because the Restatement has already defined a
contract as a binding promise.59 We would think saying it once is enough.
Comment d continues, "and full-scale enforcement by normal remedies is
often appropriate. "6 Normal contract remedies most prominently protect
the expectation interest. The adjective, 'full-scale', suggests this is what
would be protected too. The Restatement appears to need to rebut some
presumption that normal remedies are not appropriate. Moreover, 'often'
looks like a wrong word. Either 'always' or 'as a matter of course' would
seem better. Fuller wanted courts to have latitude about remedies. That the
Restatement mostly adopted Fuller's program, however, does not explain
what is going on here. What does explain it is an intellectual accident of
legal scholarship in the late 1920's and early 1930's.
Gilmore, in The Death of Contract, described how Williston and Corbin
wrote section 90. (There were giants in the earth in those days.) Williston,
Chief Reporter, believed promises become contracts by belonging to bar-
gained-for exchanges and said so in section 75. Corbin, his principal
assistant, thus Special Advisor and Reporter on Remedies, cited "hun-
dreds, perhaps, or thousands" of instances of courts having protected some
interest in promises merely relied on, and asked: "Gentlemen, what do you
intend to do about these cases?" 61 What they did is section 90. Corbin
asked a right question.
56. RESTATEMENT OF CoNTcrACTS § 333 comment b (1932).
57. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 90.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 90 comment d (1981).
59. Id. § I comment g.
60. Id.
61. G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 63.
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The idea was to make contracts of the relied-on promises in the cases.
This was the obvious move because Corbin and Williston were restating
contracts. The difficulty arose because Williston had a rigid conception of
what a contract is: a thing whose expectation interest courts protect. He
distinguished contracts from other things by what courts do about breaches
of them. This dogmatic insistence on the character of a contract led to the
notorious exchange between Williston and Coudert. Johnny's uncle prom-
ises Johnny $1000 if he buys a car. Johnny, relying on his uncle's promise,
buys a car, paying $500 for it. Williston told Coudert, at best reluctant to
believe it, Johnny could recover the entire $1000, although he gave his
uncle no consideration and relied only to the extent of $500.62 I.e., the
reliance interest is $500; the expectation interest is $1000; Johnny gets
$1000. Williston explained to the lawyers later: "Either the promise is
binding or it is not. If the promise is binding it has to be enforced as it is
made. "6 3
Williston defined 'contract' by the consequences of calling a thing such.
This looks legal-realistic but is not. Methodologically, Williston was the
opposite of a legal realist. A realist-e.g., Corbin-began with the entities
or activities. He would apply 'contract' to them as a product of having
classified them functionally. Anyway, a realist would not care very much
what one called the entities or activities. Fuller was close to Corbin in
beginning his casebook with remedies and remaining ecumenical (as Goetz
and Scott are not). Williston, conversely, began a priori with a classificia-
tion and recognized, or better constructed, only entities consistent with it.
This is Calvinist contract law. A propensity for it was built into Williston.
As he observed in his autobiography, "[w]ork and prayer were empha-
sized" (in Williston's father's childhood); a "curious feature of Calvinistic
theology" (that celebrating Christmas is an offense) "remained so far
operative. . . my father did not know until he was a grown man on what
day Christmas fell"; "[o]n Sunday morning [Williston's] family was taken
to church to hear the Calvinistic theology of the Rev. Samuel Seely"; etc.64
The theology contributed to Williston's unyielding certainty about what a
contract is. By it, things are either white ("either a promise is binding
. . ") or black (" . . . or it is not").
Section 90 of the original Restatement required that reliance be of "a
definite and substantial character" before relief could be obtained. 65
62. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Appendix, 4 PROCEEDINGS 98-99 (1926).
63. Id. at 103.
64. S. WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 6, 6-7, 24-25 (1941).
65. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932).
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Obviously, if relief were not restricted this way, slight reliance by a prom-
isee would initiate protection of his entire expectation interest. The require-
ment follows from section 90's using the promisee's reliance to motivate
recovery, not to measure it. Eisenberg, beginning from Williston's con-
versation with Coudert, instructs us that the "real reason for both limita-
tions"-the limitations are definiteness and substantiality-"apparently
rested in an unstated axiom of Williston concerning remedies." 66
Axiom (Williston; reported by Eisenberg): "[A]s a matter of contract law any
promise that is legally enforceable at all must be enforceable to its full extent
(through the award of expectation damages), rather than merely to the extent
of the promisee's reliance." 67
Section 90 of the second Restatement, of course, repudiates the axiom;
thus, the "remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires." 68
Doing this lets the section omit the 'definite and substantial' language of the
original Restatement. So by section 90, a judge may decide to award
damages because of reliance, then measure the amount of damages by the
degree of the reliance.
The situation the second Restatement corrected was this. Section 90 by its
terms applied only to avoid injustice (it still does). Imagine that 'injustice'
abbreviates 'injustice in general' not 'a particular injustice'. Where the
reliance was not large, it was unjust not to award the promisee anything and
unjust to award her expectation damages. There was injustice to be avoided;
however, section 90 did not apply because applying it would not avoid
injustice, but only exchange one manifestation of it for another.
Corbin did not accept Williston's axiom. He was happy to define con-
tracts as enforced promises (he gave other definitions too), but to enforce
some promises only to the extent of the promisee's reliance.69 More specifi-
cally, if "the action in reliance may have cost very little, and that little can be
measured," Corbin allowed, or more probably suggested, "damages
awarded might well be adjusted to that cost." 70
"In particular," comment d to section 90 says, "relief may sometimes be
limited" to "relief measured by the extent of the promisee's reliance rather
than by the terms of the promise."71 This is perhaps disingenuous in that
'sometimes' badly understates the significance of the reliance remedy in
section 90 cases. Probably more often than not, relief is limited in this way.
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.72 is a good reliance case. Fried cites it as
66. Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 640, 658 (1982).
67. Id.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1) (1981).
69. 1A A. CORBIN, CONTRACrS § 200 (1963).
70. Id. § 205.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 90 comment d (1981).
72. 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
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the "culmination" of "the American development of the doctrine of prom-
issory estoppel. ,,73 But of course this development keeps on culminating. In
Hoffman, the defendant promised the plaintiffs to build and let them
operate a grocery store. The plaintiffs relied on the defendant's promise by
selling their bakery, etc. The court appealed to section 90 to establish
liability, then awarded reliance damages. Henderson, in Promissory Estop-
pel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, refers to other cases ruling identi-
cally 74
The result in Hoffnan is ordinary, but its language is atypically direct.
The court, in working up to not protecting the expectation interest, denies it
is doing contract law. It says: "We deem it would be a mistake to regard an
action grounded on promissory estoppel as the equivalent of a breach-of-
contract action." 75 Still more explicitly it says: "Plaintiffs contend that in a
breach-of-contract action damages may include loss of profits. However,
this is a not a breach-of-contract action." 76
Henderson, surveying Hoffman and cases like it, says there is, and
laments, "a general failure to recognize that Section 90 is catalogued under
the heading of informal contracts without consideration." 77 He believes
that if courts would count promises relied on as real contracts they would be
more inclined to protect the expectation interest instead of just the reliance
interest and this would be a good thing. We should ask what has happened
since Henderson's paper, which is fifteen years old.
Except for damages, Walters v. Marathon Oil Co. 78 is like Hoffman v.
Red Owl Stores, Inc. Relying on Marathon's promise (which Marathon
broke) to sell gas to them, Walters and his wife bought property for a gas
station/food store. The district court found Marathon liable by promissory
estoppel and awarded Walters and his wife lost profits. Marathon argued on
appeal that, its liability being based on promissory estoppel, "loss of profits
is not a proper measure of damages"; instead, damages ought to be the
"expenditures in reliance on the promise," calculated by subtracting the
then present value of the property Walters bought from what he paid for it.79
Conveniently for Marathon, the calculation yielded a negative number.
Applying Indiana law, the circuit court affirmed, awarding lost profits.
Feinman cites the case first to support a claim that "the typical damage
73. Fried, Book Review, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1858, 1867 (1980).
74. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343 (1969).
75. 26 Wis. 2d at 689, 133 N.W.2d at 275 (1965).
76. Id. at 701, 133 N.W.2d at 276 (1965).
77. Henderson, supra note 74, at 378.
78. 642 E2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1981).
79. Id. at 1100.
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remedy applied in promissory estoppel cases is measured by the expecta-
tion interest." 80 But the Marathon court does not appear to be applying this
remedy It said, "[i]t is unreasonable to assume" Walters and his wife "did
not anticipate a return of profits from this investment of time and funds, but,
in reliance upon [the] promise, they had forgone the opportunity to make the
investment elsewhere"; consequently they "suffered a loss of profits as a
direct result of their reliance upon the promise. "81 Obviously, this talk is not
about the expectation interest.
The Marathon court asked, 'Where would Walters and wife have been if
they had not contracted with Marathon?', and answered, 'Getting equal
profits elsewhere'. The court protected the reliance interest, but gave just
what it would have given had it been protecting the expectation interest. Its
doing this should not surprise us because Fuller warned that reliance
damages often equal expectation damages, if we regard opportunity cost (as
we should). 82 Feinman remarks that "expectation recovery may better
reflect opportunity losses than would reliance recovery." 83 Feinman (I think
wrongly) calls 'protecting the expectation interest' what I call 'protecting
the reliance interest' if the damages awarded are the same. The line between
not recovering and recovering profits, or between expenditures and other
reliance, may itself be significant. But classically, 'reliance interest' and
'expectation interest' do not draw it.
Walters's reliance recovery ought to include the profits Walters would
have made investing elsewhere, not (as such) the profits he would have
made if Marathon had kept its promise. But Walters proved only the latter.
Because the market for capital is approximately competitive, the profits
either way should be the same modulo risk. Or Walters, by proving his
profits if Marathon had kept its promise, established a prima facie case of
the extent of his reliance, shifting to Marathon the burden of proving he
could not have gotten these profits elsewhere. This latter result is sym-
metrical with that reached by Hand in Albert.84
Goetz and Scott suggest protecting the reliance interest (as they interpret
it) as the general remedy for breach of contract. Farber, responding, imag-
ines that if contracting parties regularly broke promises there frequently
would not be damages for breaking a particular promise, because there
would not be any opportunity costs-alternative investments would be
equally unproductive. Applied in Marathon, Farber's idea is that if the
80. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REv. 678, 687-88 (1984).
81. 642 E2d at 1100.
82. See infra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
83. Feinman, supra note 80, at 688.
84. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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world were really a nasty place, there would be a difference between what
Walters was promised and what he lost by relying. 85
In a long footnote, 86 Feinman cites other cases to support the contention
that courts routinely protect the expectation interest in Restatement section
90 or promissory estoppel cases. However, these cases likewise tend not to
persuade us because they also turn on opportunity costs or involve special
equities (insurance cases or retirement benefits cases). Marathon differs
from Hoffman by awarding profits. We best explain this difference not
doctrinally, but by rates of inflation. Just returning expenditures left the
relying party less well off in 1981 than it would have been in 1965.
The word 'contract' does not appear in Marathon. If judges in cases like
Hoffman and Marathon decline to do what the Restatement instructs them
to do-talk contract law-it is because they do not want to, not because
they do not grasp the Restatement's taxonomy and the doctrinal con-
sequences of this taxonomy. They see a different Platonic form than does
the Restatement.
I will label 'Willistonian' anyone who accepts Williston's axiom. If we
define a thing by what it is not, Goetz and Scott are the arch-anti-
Willistonians. Fuller is anti-Willistonian, too, but perhaps not implacably
so. We are able to distinguish several kinds of Willistonians. The orthodox
(middle-of-the-road) Willistonian will draw the line between a contract and
something else between Restatement sections 75 (bargained-for promises)
and 90 (relied-on promises). There are possible deviations to the left and to
the right. Rightness and lefiness are a matter of degree; however, a right
Willistonian asserts that promises relied on are contracts too while a left
Willistonian denies that even promises bargained for are contracts. Evi-
dently the Corbin/Williston compromise of the original Restatement is right
Willistonian.
I will argue briefly and schematically for middle-of-the-road Willis-
tonianism. Contracts are those transactions having an expectation interest
which we will protect; only bargained-for promises can be contracts. 87
Breach of a promise merely relied on is a tort, if anything. 88 Middle-of-the-
road Willistonianism is thesis B: Only the expectation interest counts.89 If
we equivocate over 'contract', theses A and B may be thought to differ
merely doctrinally not substantively. There is no observational difference
between doctrinally different, but substantively identical, theses. Theses
differing only doctrinally are notational variants of each other; doctrinal
85. Farber, Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 303, 306-10 (1983).
86. Feinman, supra note 80, at 688 n.53.
87. See infra, Part ID.
88. See infra, Part IC.
89. See supra text accompanying note 7.
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differences in this sense are epiphenomenal. Then we may translate B into
A: The expectation interest counts too. The languages expressing them will
differ slightly, but case outcomes will be the same. To get from B to A, we
just expand the scope of 'contract' so that it includes relied-on promises,
but we retain the results in the cases. By both A and B, promises bargained
for are contracts. By B but not A, promises merely relied on are potential
torts. By A but not B, promises merely relied on are contracts having only
reliance interests in them protected.
Whittier was a contracts scholar whose floruit was about when the first
Restatement was being put together. He is the left Willistonian. As late as
1929-30, he argued that a contract ought to arise only if there has been an
"actual meeting of the minds mutually communicated." 90 So he required
what the objectivist requires plus a mental element. Consider the situation
in which traditional doctrino and the case law find a contract, while Whittier
would not. Y addresses X, 'I offer to sell you my cow for $10'; X replies, 'I
accept'. Assume, for whatever reasons, the minds of X and Y do not meet.
Whittier need not accommodate the cases and is trying to reform doctrine,
but intuitively in some situations of this type the law must do something. He
handled the difficulty by characterizing a culpable causing of the minds of
parties not to meet (so they could not contract) as "carelessly misleading
the other party into the reasonable belief that there was assent." 91 Then he
contended that the liability for so misleading "might well have been held to
be in tort." 92 Obviously, 'carelessly' is a tort word. Whittier asked, " [i]f D
drives down Michigan Avenue, Chicago, in a careless manner but no one is
hurt, can any of those who might have been hurt sue D?"' 93 He thought that
if Y carelessly or even intentionally misleads X butX is not hurt, X ought not
to be able to recover anything from Y. Much turns on how we define 'hurt'.
Using tort concepts, Whittier defined it as making the aggrieved party
worse off than he would have been if the parties had not interacted.
Evidently, the reliance interest, not the expectation interest, is thus pro-
tected.
For promises only relied on there are two bits of evidence from Part IA
suggesting that tort doctrine should apply. The categories there are ordered
(by Fuller) so that juxtaposition tells us something. The Restatement section
90 cases come just before the misrepresentation cases. At least, then, if we
get beyond the former we are applying tort law. Also, if for promises relied
on we protect the reliance interest, but not the expectation interest, we use
the reliance interest to motivate and to measure recovery. Then we avoid the
90. Whittier, The Restatement of Contracts and MutualAssent, 17 CALiF. L. REv. 441,442 (1929).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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discontinuity the original Restatement encountered regarding 'definite and
substantial reliance'. The promisee would continue to rely, but receive no
relief until he had relied definitely and substantially Then he would get his
expectation interest. At some point, perhaps $200, as Johnny pays more for
a car in Coudert's and Williston's hypothetical case, 94 his uncle's liability
instantly increases from $0 to $1000.
Moreover, section 90 just looks like tort law. Its tort-like aspect was
recognized early. In 1932, compensating somebody for having detrimen-
tally relied was called "the tort principle" in section 90 talk.95 Intuitively,
the contention is that facts of cases applying section 90 are not outlandishly
distinct from those in ordinary misrepresentation cases. (The similarity cuts
both ways; Fuller lamented that it is the expectation interest that frequently
receives protection in misrepresentation cases.) "Yesterday I said, 'I prom-
ise to give you a horse.' But I did not give you anything, and today you
accuse me of the heinous immorality of breaking a promise. '96 "No, I
reply," hypothetically admitting I (merely) misrepresented, but denying the
basis of a Restatement section 90 cause of action, "I am not guilty of that at
all, but only of the much lesser offense of lying. All that happened was that
yesterday I stated falsely that I was promising to give you a horse. ", 97 "It is
easy to see what is wrong with this story," van Fraassen comments on it. "In
saying, 'I promise . . . ', I must (normally?) be taken to be doing
something more than implying or stating an autobiographical fact
.... -"98 The something more I am doing is, he says, "expressing. "99
We want to find language that brings together misrepresentation and
section 90. The expression 'estoppel'-with subspecies 'estoppel in pais'
and 'promissory estoppel'-purports to do this, but arguably is empty.
Gilmore, taking the easy shot that sometimes appealed to him, dismissed
'estoppel' as "simply a way of saying that, for reasons which the court does
not care to discuss, there must be judgment for plaintiff." 10 However,
persons promised to or represented to equally want a sentence to be true and
they rely on its being true. Fuller helps us here by giving 'interests in
affirmation' to designate this shared element.
94. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
95. Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1, 22 (1933).
96. van Fraassen, Calibration: A Frequency Justification for Personal Probability, in PHYSICS,
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ADOLF GRUNBAUM 295, 296 (1983).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 64. "It was Oliphant who, on my very first day in Law School,
embarrassed me before the class of 365 students," Douglas related. "He asked my name, had me stand,
and then asked, 'Mr. Douglas, what is an estoppel?' My mind was a blank. All I could say was, 'I know
it's not anything you find in the woods. Whether it is a legal principle or a disease, I haven't the least
idea."' W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN 146 (1974).
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In the course of not letting the United States punish contracting parties
for misrepresenting that they intended to perform their contract, the court in
Chaplin v. United States denied that an intention, "as manifest by false and
misleading promises, standing alone, is afact in the sense required for a
conviction on the charge of false pretenses."'' 1 As contract law read
anachronistically,102 Chaplin instructs us that the expectation measure of
damages is, by itself, optimal or enough; that we would not breach effi-
ciently, if we were to anticipate having to pay off nonbreaching parties and
go to jail (or merely litigate whether we must go to jail).
This optimality is none of our present business, which is tort law. In tort
law, sometimes "the law has accepted a person's state of mind [including
his intentions] as a fact." 103 Then 'I intend A' may misrepresent. And if a
"promise itself is generally regarded as a representation of a present
intention to perform," promising may misrepresent the fact of "the
speaker's present state of mind [if] made by one not intending to per-
form. "104
Nobody is doing serious metaphysics about this. What matters is not that
promises and representations are as entities similar. Rather it is we ought
not to distinguish among the consequences at law of pieces of language
unless we have a functional reason to do so. And for relied-on promises that
matter to Restatement section 90 and ordinary misrepresentations of fact in
tort law not criminal law we just do not have this reason.
D.
The Reliance Interest appeared in 1936, four years after the first Restate-
ment was published. The chronology matters because it denied Fuller time
to reflect on Williston's claim that cases falling under section 90 are contract
cases. The technical equipment Fuller brought to the cases also is signifi-
cant. In its philosophical aspect, it was predominantly Aristotle's ethics.
The ethics helped Fuller to isolate his three interests, but after that it did
nobody any good.
The Reliance Interest has this structure. Part 1 argues early on that the
reliance interest is more worthy of protection than is the expectation
interest. The rest of part 1 and part 2 celebrate the reliance interest by
showing that courts protect it more often that we suspected. The argument
relates to the celebration by inspiring us to read charitably what Fuller says
about the case law. The evidence, however, does not require that we take the
101. 157 F.2d 697, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
102. See supra, Pt. I, § 4.
103. James & Gray, Misrepresentation-Part 11, 37 MD. L. REv. 488, 504 (1977-78).
104. Id. at 506.
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case law as being as solicitous of the reliance interest as he indicates. Fuller
has disposed us to read the case law charitably because he has given us, a
priori, a reason to like the reliance interest better than the expectation
interest. Because much depends on this reason, we should inspect carefully
how good it is.
Pertinent passages of Aristotle opposed corrective justice, putting things
back where they had been and should be, to distributive justice, getting
things right to start with. 105 Fuller stated: "It is obvious that the three
'interests' we have distinguished [the restitution, reliance, and expectation
interests] do not present equal claims to judicial intervention." 106 He
recognized that the restitution interest presents the best claim. Protecting
the restitution or the reliance interest does corrective justice. Aristotle
conflated these interests. Having posited a theoretical reason-corrective
justice is "intermediate"-to find gains and losses offsetting, Aristotle
made up gains if these were not otherwise evident-just as Fuller, playing
realist, said we covertly protect the reliance interest by constructing a
fictional something to give back. 107 However, Fuller, fully exploiting his
mathematical resourses, asserted, not unreasonably given what he had to
work with, that the restitution interest "presents twice as strong a claim to
judicial intervention as the reliance interest, since if A not only causes B to
lose one unit but appropriates that unit to himself, the resulting discrepancy
between A and B is not one unit but two." 108
When Fuller arrived at last at the expectation interest, he was speaking
less urgently, not about corrective justice (which courts obtain by protecting
the restitution or reliance interests), but about distributive justice. And
mostly he was puzzled. He had read the cases and realized the law regularly
protects the expectation interest. But he could not see why. He said,
sounding like Aristotle and sparing us explicit quantification, "the prom-
isee who has actually relied on the promise, even though he may not thereby
have enriched the promisor, certainly presents a more pressing case for
relief than the promisee who merely demands satisfaction for his disap-
pointment in not getting what was promised him. "109 The words 'actually'
and 'merely' signal the weights Fuller assigned the reliance and the expec-
tation interests respectively; 'certainly' indicates for Fuller the question was
not open, had already been decided.
Fuller said, "It is as a matter of fact no easy thing to explain why the
normal rule of contract recovery should be that which measures damages by
105. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics 1 13 0 b3 0 - 113 1a9 , in THE BASIC WORKS 927, 1005-06 (R.
McKeon ed. 1941).
106. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 56.
107. ARISTOTLE, supra note 105, 1132a6-24, at 1008-09.
108. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 56.
109. Id.
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the value of the promised performance." 110 As Fuller says judgmentally,
this concern to protect the expectation interest "throws its shadow across
our whole subject" (shadows are unwanted entities). His efforts bear out
that it is no easy thing to explain this concern.
Fuller tried several explanations: the "psychological" (the promisee
feels hurt even if she has not relied); the "will theory" (contracting parties
legislate the result); the "economic or institutional approach" (our expect-
ing promises to be kept generates a kind of property in them). II He rejected
these explanations, respectively, because we do not protect every promise;
because parties contracting do not legislate to protect the expectation
interest but get the remedy imposed on them; and because the property we
have in promises is a consequence of the remedies we give for breaking
them, not a cause of the remedies. Fuller is doing fine so far; we all dislike
the reasons he is rejecting.
Fuller's explanation has two aspects. The less interesting aspect invokes
"the need for facilitating reliance on business agreements.""12 This aspect
supports protecting reliance instead of something else. I.e., it is a reason to
protect the expectation interest only if the interests coincide. The other
aspect is that protecting the expectation interest provides "a prophylaxis
against the losses resulting from detrimental reliance." This aspect was
worked up from a "suspicion that there lies hidden behind the protection of
the expectancy a concern to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the
opportunity to enter other contracts." 113 As Fuller saw contract remedies,
we protect the expectation interest to protect indirectly the more fundamen-
tal reliance interest. As I see the two interests, this is a small tail on a big
dog, regardless of how hard it is wagging.
Often, the expectation interest and the reliance interest come to the same
thing. X contracts with Y. He could have contracted with Z on identical
terms but wanted only one contract. But where opportunity cost is not high,
we ordinarily rely less than we expect. In this situation, Fuller's explanation
does badly "Whatever tends to discourage breach of contract," Fuller told
us truly, "tends to prevent the losses occasioned through reliance." 114 This
does not get us very far. Dying of one disease keeps us from contracting
another. But we do not get excited about connecting the diseases this way.
Fuller should say why awarding exactly the expectancy is good. But he has
done the best he can. What else he says is as analysis embarrassing. "It is
therefore possible to view the rule measuring damages by the expectancy in
110. Id. at 57.
111. Id. at 57-60.
112. Id. at 62.
113. Id. at 61.
114. Id.
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a quasi-criminal aspect, its purpose being not so much to compensate the
promisee as to penalize breach of promise by the promisor." 11 5
To find out what Fuller missed, we listen to Perini, the contracts teacher
in One L. He gets things wrong too, but they are different things.
We were studying Hadley v. Baxendale, a famous case which established a
limit on the kinds of damages a winning plaintiff in a contract suit could
collect. Perini asked us what the rule of Hadley was not designed to do. He
said there was a one-word answer. People raised their hands offering
responses ranging from "work" to "make sense," and Perini toured the room,
quickly shooting them down: "No," "Never," "Silly," "You think that
makes sense?"
When he saw my hand, he whirled and pointed.
"To punish," I said. I was shocked I was speaking. My heart was slamming
in my chest ....
"How so?"
"The way the rule works, it doesn't act to punish somebody who breaches a
contract."
"What difference does that make?"
"It means that damages aren't awarded to deter breach."
"What are they intended to do, then?" Perini asked.
"Just compensate the loss."
"Right!" said Perini. "Contract damages are merely intended to compen-
sate plaintiff for his loss. You leave all that soul-splitting over punishment
behind in Torts and Criminal Law-it's not for Contracts!" 16
Perini is partly right. Contract law is not intended to punish. But Fuller
demonstrated it is not, in its aspect of protecting the expectation interest,
intended to compensate either. It overcompensates. Or, if it does not, the
loss it is compensating is not very important. The student and Perini
confuse deterrence and punishment. Criminal law deters by punishing. Tort
law deters by compensating (punitive damages aside). Both deterring and
compensating are significant for tort law. Both are significant for contract
law too. But contract law, understood to protect the expectation interest,
compensates only incidentally as it goes about deterring. Its function is to
put productive resources in the right place, not to distribute their products
justly (or any other way).
115. Id.
116. S. TUROW, ONE L 73 (1977).
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It gets resources to where they are going to be used most efficiently'and
keeps them there. Y is going to break his promise to X if and only if he can
do this profitably To protect X's expectation interest in a broken promise, a
court puts her in as good a position as she would have been in had Ykept that
promise. Then Y will break the promise if and only if Y can gain despite
having to pay X. But if Y can do this, the community is better off if he does
it. The community is better off only because Y is better off. That is, X is no
worse off; Y is better off; everybody else is the same (by hypothesis).
We see easily that, if we assess damages beyond the expectation measure,
Y is going to keep too many promises. Imagine this promise: X's expecta-
tion interest, $10; Y's profit from breaking it, $11; damages, $12. Y keeps
this promise because this puts him $1 ahead. Nevertheless the community
loses $1 by his doing so.
Identically, if damages are assessed at less than the expectation measure,
Y is going to break too many promises. Imagine this promise: X's expecta-
tion interest, $12; Y's profit from breaking it, $11; damages, $10. Y breaks
this promise because this puts him $1 ahead. Nevertheless, the community
loses $1 by his doing so.
Protecting the expectation interest deters just the right amount, optimally
deters. Fuller was misled here in the way he was usually misled, especially
in his debate with Hart. 117 He believed contract law has something to do
with morality; however, mostly it does not, as Holmes taught us long ago it
does not.
II. GOETZ AND SCOTT
A.
Courts have been unsophisticated about calculating the reliance interest.
For example, Devecmon v. Shaw 18 gave its promisee out-of-pocket costs.
Because these were the entire expenses of his trip to Europe, the court's
decision made Devecmon better off than he would have been had the
promise not been made. However, being as well but no better off than if the
promise had not been made has been the test of protecting reliance. The best
thing about Enforcing Promises is its detailed determination of how a
promisee relies.
Goetz and Scott provide a diagram which I reproduce as figure 1 and will
explain. 119
117. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REv. 630
(1958).
118. 69 Md. 199, 14A. 464 (1888).
119. Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 1268, figure 1.
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Figure 1.
X will be the promisee as the story develops. Right now she is just
spending money. We plot dollars she spends in the present (period 1) and
the future (period 2) along vertical and horizontal axes respectively
Because she begins with $100 to allocate between present and future, X can
be at any point along (or inside if she gets confused) the diagonal line
(budget constraint) running between the 100's on the axes. 11 through 15 are
indifference curves, loci of points at which X is equally satisfied. As we
have drawn everything, X will spend $50 at period 1, then $50 at period 2,
thereby locating herself at e1 . At this point indifference curve 11 is tangent to
the budget constraint. Indifference curves higher and further to the right
indicate X's greater satisfaction. She is not going to be satiated by having
$100. By reaching indifference curve 11, she gets the most satisfaction
possible for her for $100.
Pretend Y gives $50 to X at period 2. We are still not talking promise, only
gift. She can spend the $50 at period 2 but not at period 1. The budget
constraint gets displaced to the right. Although X could choose to spend
$100 at period 1 and $50 at period 2, $0 at period 1 and $150 at period 2,
etc., the most she can spend at period 1 is $100. Imagine Y merely gives X
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the money, without telling her at period 1 he is going to do this. X will spend
$50 at period 1 trying to get to el , as above, and must spend $100 (all the
rest) at period 2, therefore will be at e4 on indifference curve 14. 14 is to the
northeast of I1 so X is more satisfied there. ButX can do even better; it is here
the institution of promising enters.
So let Y promise X at period 1 to give her $50 at period 2. X, relying on
Y's promise, can spend $75 at period 1 and (assuming Y keeps his promise)
$75 at period 2, thereby ending up on indifference curve 12 at e2. X is
happier on 12 than she would have been on 14. Goetz and Scott call the
difference in dollars between the levels of X's satisfaction on 12 and on 14 X's
beneficial reliance. Beneficial reliance is measured in dollars, not units of
utility. Where we calculate the point on the vertical axis matters because, at
different points, the indifference curves are different distances apart. Here it
should be calculated at $50.12 is inadvertently drawn to show too little slope
opposite the $50 point so beneficial reliance misleadingly looks infinitely
large.
Pretend Y does not give $50 to X at period 2 (breaks his promise). Having
already spent $75 at period 1 in reliance on Y's promise, X must spend only
$25 in period 2 (all she has left). She is at e3 on indifference curve 13. IfX
had not relied on Y's promise, she would have ended up at e1 on higher
indifference curve 11. The dollar difference between X's satisfaction on 1,
and that on 13 is what Goetz and Scott call X's detrimental reliance. The
court inDevecmon probably tried to give detrimental reliance in some sense
(it evidently was not trying to do something more subtle); its award,
however, is only distantly related to detrimental reliance as Goetz and Scott
identify it. A comparable award to X would leave her on 12 (giving $50: all Y
promised) or on 15 (giving $25: all X spent relying). But Goetz and Scott
have the ideas precisely right, i.e., their detrimental reliance is the real
detrimental reliance.
We derive the following matrix of outcomes. We get the outcomes of
column 1 or column 2 depending on whether Y promises or not. The
outcomes-the uj's-are the utilities to X of the combinations of Y's
promising and performing. The subscripts of the 'u's are the subscripts of
the corresponding indifference curves or points of figure 1 on/at which X
might end up.
Y Y
promises does not promise
Y performs u2  U4
Y does not perform u3  u,
Imagine tomorrow is X's birthday. X usually buys a cake for it herself
(price: $5). Y may/may not give her a cake/promise to give her a cake. If Y
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promises to give her a cakeX is going to rely on the promise and so not buy
a cake herself. X's beneficial reliance is the difference in dollars between u2
(1 cake + $5) and u4 (2 cakes). Set it at $3. It's between $0 and $5. Also, X's
detrimental reliance is the difference in dollars between u, (1 cake) and u3
(no cake + $5). Set it at $6. If Y promises one of the reliances will be
realized.
Or imagine R.R. and P.N. have robbed a train and are being pursued by a
posse. They come to a cliff. R.R. climbs down but P.N., less agile, cannot.
R.R. may/may not say, 'I promise, if you jump I will catch you'. If R.R.
says it, P.N. will jump and R.R. may/may not catch him. If R.R. does not
say it, P.N. will not jump. If P.N. jumps and is caught, he escapes. If P.N.
jumps and is not caught, he is killed. If P.N. does not jump, he is captured
by the posse and killed (probability: .5) or escapes (probability: .5). His
beneficial reliance is the difference in dollars between u2 (escaping) and u4
(escaping with a probability of .5 or being killed with a probability of .5).
His detrimental reliance is the difference between u, ( = u4: escaping with a
probability of .5 or being killed with a probability of .5) and u3 (being
killed).
B.
Goetz and Scott have a thesis. It is Thesis C of the introduction: Only the
reliance interest counts. But Goetz and Scott interpret reliance so richly
they have to choose among various ways to count it. We will wonder by late
in Part IIC whether or not to describe the rule of Enforcing Promises by
'protecting the reliance interest as such'. Goetz and Scott and everybody
else are after the "optimal damage formula" (for broken promises).120 We
will cut our teeth on this version of the formula: the "economic objective of
regulating promises is to maximize the net beneficial reliance derived from
promise-making activity.' 12 Expressed this way the formula is not pre-
cisely right. We may speculate that the mistake is inadvertent. The passage I
quote appears in the conclusion of Enforcing Promises, when Goetz and
Scott (conceivably the reader too) are tired, and possibly they are inatten-
tive. Instead, they may know what they are doing and be arguing
enthymematically-suppressing a premise. At least they do not pursue this
version of the formula in the body of the paper where they seriously commit
themselves. But starting here lets us approach the true and beautiful
gradually enough not to be overcome by it.
Net beneficial reliance (NBR) is a quantity of money, not an activity. To
calculate it, we weight Y's detrimental reliance and beneficial reliance by
120. Id. at 1277.
121. Id. at 1321.
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the respective probabilities that they will be realized and subtract the one
from the other. The formula is familiar from estimating expected utility in
other contexts. Paradigmatically, if we win $1 if a tossed fair coin comes
up heads and $0 if it comes up tails, expected utility is
($1 x .5) + ($0 x .5) = $.50. We multiply each possible outcome by
its probability and add the products. The formula in the context of Enforcing
Promises is pB - (1 - p)R. Here 'B' and 'R' represent gross beneficial
and gross detrimental reliance respectively; 'p' represents the probability Y
will keep the promise. Because Y must keep the promise or break it, and the
probability of a certainty is 1, the probability he breaks it is 1 - p. Imagine
that the probability Y keeps the promise in the hypothetical about the
cake from Part HA is .8. X's net beneficial reliance is then
(.8 x $3) - (.2 x $6) = $1.20. Also if the probability R.R. performs is
.5, P.N.'s net beneficial reliance is 0 because the probability of escaping
and that of being killed are both .5 whether or not the promise is made.
The first significant point is that protecting the expectation interest of the
promisee, the normal remedy, has, Goetz and Scott believe, just about
nothing to do with any objective of theirs. They say that by "imposing a
sanction in excess of the social costs of breach," protecting the expectation
interest "overdeters socially useful promising, except in competitive mar-
kets in which expectation is equivalent to reliance. ' 122 E.g., the expecta-
tion interest of X in the opening illustration from Part IIA is $50. We would
expect the reliances, or the reliances added together, to be significantly less.
Evidently, Goetz and Scott are calculating what is socially useful dif-
ferently than I did in Part I. But the interpretation of 'expectation interest' is
less straightforward later.
Net beneficial reliance is obviously a good thing and it is better, ceteris
paribus, to have more of it. As I say, Goetz and Scott misleadingly speak of
maximizing it. We will call it a 'target variable', adopting the language of
the theory of economic policy.123 We can determine or affect the value of a
target variable and this value matters to us for itself. Imagine Y makes a
particular promise. B and R, as above, 124 are X's beneficial and detrimental
reliances in this promise; p is again the probability Y will keep it. Some
promises, those having pB greater than (1 - p)R, increase NBR, taken
across the entire social unit. Others, those having pB less than (1 - p)R,
diminish it. B and R depend on what X does, i.e., if and the extent to which
she relies or is going to rely. We are going to pretend B and R are constant
for a particular promise. This is mildly unrealistic, becauseX's reliance may
122. Id. at 1297.
123. K. FOx, J. SENGUPTA & E. THORBECKE, THE THEORY OF QUANTITATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY WITH
APPLICATIONS TO ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILIZATION 20-51 (1966).
124. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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well depend on what we do to Y if he breaks this promise; X knows that our
sanctions will affect p. But what is analytically interesting in this variability
of B and R has been expressed elegantly by Farber.125 For our different
purposes the world is complicated enough without taking this variability
into account. Nevertheless we are going to let p, a disposition of Y, vary.
That it does will be significant because we will wantp or something like it to
be a target variable by the time we get to Part liD.
We get to manipulate D (damages), what Y pays X if Y breaks his
promise. Call D an 'instrument variable'. The idea is to manipulate instru-
ment variables to get ideal values of target variables. If we change D, we do
two things. We change p in the direction we change D. We are less likely to
break a promise if we are going to be shot for breaking it. Let n be the
number of promises made. We change n in the opposite direction. We are
also less likely to make a promise if we are going to be shot for breaking it
(anyway if the promise is gratuitous-we investigate in Part lID whether Y
is willing to risk being shot for a price).
Pretend n is constant. Then NBR will vary directly with p and we could
maximize it by setting D as high as we can (e.g., death by slicing).
Nevertheless n would decline. NBR is 0 if nobody promises. So we start
increasing D from 0 and get changes inp and n pushing NBR respectively
up and down. Ideally we increase D until the effects of the changes offset
each other and we stop, maximizing NBR there. But this will not work
because there is no systematic relation between whether a promise is made
and its NBR. Let e be a small increment. Increasing D by e might lower
NBR, increasing D by 2e might raise it, increasing D by 3e might lower it,
etc.
This is not a big thing. As Goetz and Scott attest in the body, but not the
conclusion, of their paper, their damage rule is intended "to deter" not
those promises reducing NBR, but "all promises with net social costs,"
and to "encourage" not those promises increasing NBR, but "those with
net benefits. "1126 (D, being a penalty not a subsidy, does not encourage any
promise, supposing 'encourage' is used ordinarily.127) They say, too,
"optimization is defined as maximizing the net social benefits of prom-
issory activity-that is, the benefits of promises minus their costs." '128
To maximize NBR by itself, however, is bad because not only the
(expected) satisfaction of the promisee (pB - (1 - p)R) but also the satis-
faction of the promisor (G) matters. If we maximize NBR we maximize net
social benefits just in case the promisor is indifferent prelegally between
125. Farber, supra note 85, at 306-10.
126. Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 1281.
127. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
128. Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 1274.
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making and not making the promise. That the promisor is thus indifferent is
the premise Enforcing Promises perhaps suppressed. That the promisor
ordinarily is not thus indifferent is why D, if we calculate it independently
of G, does not regiment X's promises so that X makes them in order of
declining contribution to the community.
The rule Goetz and Scott provide is complicated, but makes sense. I set it
out, and after a remark about p, explain it.
(1 - p)D = (1 - p)R - pB
Calculatingp, the probability Y will not breach, presents a bit of a problem.
The problem isp is not observable. Goetz and Scott direct us: "Letp be the
promisor's reasonable, subjective assessment of the probability that he will
perform a promise under an existing legal rule calling for damages of D in
the event of breach.' ' 129 This is a mouthful and signals their distress. It is
difficult to identify p and damages depend on it. I do not object to having
damages depend on p or to the way Goetz and Scott calculate it. A judge
estimating it is going to get it wrong a lot. But ifX does not believe the judge
is going to get p wrong systematically, the formula still works. Yet, if a
different rule were to come along that did not requirep, and were otherwise
as good, I would rather use it (it is going to come along). Imagine asking Y
about this probability. He will not divulge it and, even if he were willing to
divulge it, it might not exist (for example, if in the individual instance
'reasonable' is incompatible with 'subjective'). Because tu quoque argu-
ments are inherently ineffective against bystanders, the reader should not
give me leave to do what Goetz and Scott do; nevertheless, I will be
marginally more inclined to request similar calculational concessions of the
reader than I would be had Goetz and Scott restricted themselves to
observables.
Inspect the right side of the damage equation first. It specifies just
negated NBR. We may, if we wish, call this 'net detrimental reliance'
(NDR). It is the expected disvalue of Y's promising to X. Depending on
which of detrimental reliance and beneficial reliance, weighted by their
probabilities, predominates, NDR is positive or negative. The left side of
the equation directs us to multiply damages (D) by the improbability of Y's
having to pay them (1 - p).
Simply put, Y is just trying to be happy. Maybe a way to do this is to
promiseX something. Accordingly, Ypromises if he figures he will be made
happier by this. We are just trying to make everybody happy. We can do
this-admittedly in a small way-by getting Yto promiseX something just
in case the community gains by it. The community for purposes of private
129. Id. at 1281.
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contract is X and Y. (If Z is going to be hurt too badly by their agreement,
then what X and Y have is not a contract but an illegal bargain. For
convenience I disregard third-party beneficiaries. The law usually does this
too for the identical reason, calling them 'incidental'.) We internalize to Y
the cost to X of what Y does. We do this to induce Y to act not only for his
own well-being, but for X's also. By doing so, Y will maximize the
community's satisfaction instead of his own. The cost to X of Y's promising
is (1 - p)R - pB. We intend to impose this cost on Y at the time of his
promising. Because Y may not break his promise, we cannot simply equate
damages to this. If the probability is p that Y will keep the promise, Y can
expect to pay (1 - p)D if he does not keep it. We are required to set D equal
to the cost we want to impose, divided by 1 - p, if we are to impose this
cost.
We can do other things using this technique. I.e., we can maximize NBR
by getting Y to promise X something just in case X gains by it. We do this
simply by adding 'G' to the right side of the equation Goetz and Scott give
us. The equation, as they write it, gets Y to take account of X's satisfaction
besides Y's own. The revised equation then factors out Y's own satisfaction.
But as I said we do not have a reason to do this.
In a restricted way, Goetz and Scott are exactly right. Their rule dis-
courages every promise that should not be made. Imagine Y contemplating
promising X something in a situation in which Y's doing so has a negative
NBR (positive NDR). We want him to promise just in case his advantage
from doing so is greater than X's expected loss. Then, on balance, there is
social gain. Y should subtract the cost to X of Y's promising, (1 - p)R - pB
from his own gain G from promising. He should promise depending on the
sign of what is left. Enforcing Promises gives a rule that gets him to do this.
With it Y is looking at having to pay ((1 - p)R - pB)/(l - p) with a
probability of 1 - p. Y, by doing the best thing for himself, will do the best
social thing too.
I will make a few qualifying remarks still in the spirit of Goetz and Scott.
We must keep in mind that they are talking consistently about the benefits of
promising, not of performing promises. Evidently, it is often socially good
for Y to give something to X-i.e., if X would get greater satisfaction from
having it than Y. Promising to give it is a move toward giving it, but Goetz
and Scott are not celebrating it as such. Also, their rule does not do anything
affirmative to encourage Y to promise in circumstances where it is socially
valuable to do this. It just does not get in his way. Imagine it would be
extremely advantageous to X to know that Y will do something, but Y is
marginally better off if he does not promise X he will do it. I.e.,
(1 - p)R - pB is large and negative while G is small and negative. Y, if he
regards only his interest, does not promise and the rule does not get him to.
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What Goetz and Scott do is innovative in three respects. They apply
(something in the neighborhood of) a reliance measure more promis-
cuously than anybody else. Fuller may be read to have done the same thing
but, as I have said, he was probably more cautious. They determine detri-
mental reliance differently than does anybody else. But they are exactly
right here. Also, having committed themselves to applying a reliance
measure, or something like it, and having constructed the correct measure
of detrimental reliance, they do not less interestingly simply give X the
detrimental reliance under that measure. To see the difference, we divide (as
do they) their damage equation by (1 - p):
D = R - (p/(1 - p))B.
That is, they fall short of giving detrimental reliance, as they correctly
calculate it, by (p/(1 - p))B. Goetz and Scott call p/(1 - p) the 'good-faith
ratio' and a use of it to reduce D below R a 'damage offset'. They speculate:
"[T]he good-faith ratio and the damage offset suggest a possible explana-
tion for the language of the Restatement of Contracts, which conditions
both the enforceability and the magnitude of reliance-based sanctions upon
the 'requirements of justice.""'130 The expression 'possible explanation' is
equivocal here. If Goetz and Scott believe the writers of the present
Restatement contemplated ratios and offsets when they- added the con-
cluding sentence to section 90, Goetz and Scott are being engagingly
modest. The rule of liability belongs to Enforcing Promises; the present
Restatement probably intends less ambitiously just to withdraw in an
orderly way from the Willistonian position that a court must protect the
expectation interest in a contract or nothing. Nevertheless, the rule of
liability may explain, in the sense of 'justify', this sentence. Probably it
does not though. As the Restatement uses it, 'justice' likely evokes an
Aristotelian/Fullerian concern for compensating X which the damage rule
of Enforcing Promises does not do.131 "A damage offset based on the good-
faith ratio and on the amount of potential beneficial reliance," Goetz and
Scott contend, "will encourage the optimal quantity and quality of prom-
ises by reflecting in the promisors decision calculus both the harmful and
beneficial effects of his promise-making."'1 32 I will argue, mostly in Part
ID, that the rule of Enforcing Promises gets the quantity right and the
quality wrong.
130. Id. at 1283.
131. See infra Part IIC.
132. Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 1282-83.
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To motivate their damage rule, Goetz and Scott talk tort law to us, not
contract law. They claim their "approach is equivalent to the balancing of
prospective costs and benefits under the widely accepted Learned Hand test
for the required duty of care in potential tort-producing activities." 133 The
Hand test as they state it results in "an actor['s being] guilty of negligence if
the loss caused by the accident multiplied by the probability of its occur-
rence exceeds the burden of taking adequate precautions." 134 Enforcing
Promises continues, reinforcing its analogy, "there are strong theoretical
parallels between the production of dangerous, but useful, products and the
making of promises." 135
We will make up a story about a possible tort to test this claim, without
first taking time to get clear concerning what 'equivalent', as Goetz and
Scott use it, comes to. Also, to firm up what Hand was talking about, we will
parody his test. We do this despite a definition of love being never having to
apply the Hand test. Pretend Poncho loves Alice. From his point of view,
things are going badly Alice is married to Steve; they have four children;
nobody is getting any younger; etc. Poncho has trouble just seeing Alice.
Alice regularly runs early in the morning. Poncho is a scholar instead of a
runner; but he can see her if he gets up early and drives past her while she
runs. To decide if he should do this, he applies the Hand test. He really
enjoys just looking at Alice. He knows he might accidentally hit her, albeit
he drives cautiously, etc.-this could occur if, on seeing her, he is over-
come with excitement. But Poncho reasonably estimates the probability of
hitting her is low. The cost of taking adequate precautions is his sleeping
late-giving up seeing Alice, a significant loss to him and so to society. He
rightly decides to drive past Alice, but just three times a week. (It gets
boring at the margin as he drives past more often; thus, he sets a limit to his
love and beyond a particular frequency the Hand test tells him to sleep late.)
Eventually, however, he hits Alice and injures her. He is not liable to Alice
according to the Hand test, because the burden of taking adequate precau-
tions to prevent the injury is greater than the cost of the injury, discounted by
its improbability.
Evidently the rule Goetz and Scott give us is equivalent to the Hand test
in that these get the number of promises/drives right. Nevertheless, a lot is
built into 'accidentally'. We begin to unpack it as 'not being (further)
responsible'. However, imagine that Poncho, while calculating, realizes he
might decide to drive into Alice-things as I say are bad. When Poncho
133. Id. at 1274-75.
134. Id. at 1275 n.34.
135. Id. at 1275.
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takes account of the improbability that he will commit a battery, the
calculus still says 'Drive'. Unexpectedly, one day he does hit her on purpose
and injures her.
Or imagine Alice divorces Steve. He has been making the world better
off by consorting with Elizabeth who does not run but lies around looking
sultry. Alice is going to decide about marrying Poncho who is more than
willing. Alice applies the Hand test. She knows wives occasionally kill
their husbands and their doing this at least breaks the marriage contract.
But her "reasonable, subjective assessment of the probability" she is going
to kill him gives a low value. The cost of preventing the injury is not
marrying. She immodestly but rightly believes it substantial-life is not
worth much to Poncho without her. As to the magnitude of the injury, Alice
thinks, if things go badly, Poncho's being dead will not be a big loss to
Poncho or to anybody else. She marries him. Unexpectedly, Poncho also
gets interested in Elizabeth; so, Alice decides to kill him, which she does.
Disregard the criminal law. It is not at present doing anything to interest
us. Either it is distributive, rather than allocative (keeping intentional
killings, etc. out of the free market by not permitting us to buy them by
paying tort damages); or it encourages us to make contracts rather than
commit torts, where we might do either (advantage: a jury has to guess at
the value of a tort to the injured party but by contracting she partly reveals
it).
There is a vast difference in tort law between the case in which Poncho
drives into Alice accidentally and the cases in which Poncho does this
intentionally and in which Alice kills Poncho intentionally: their acting as
the Hand test directs absolves them only in the first. I.e., the Hand test is
otherwise ordinarily insensitive to deontological (noneconomic) nuances,
but it distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked. So
'accidentally' is translatable as 'not as a consequence of a (new) decision
about behaving'. This perhaps is not a big advance over the last reading
because 'decision' might end up getting defined using 'responsibility'. But
for our purposes in applying the Hand test, we may legitimately take
deciding as a datum. The Hand test does not apply to next to last decisions.
Neither does it apply to intentional torts.
Holmes: "I take it that a man may bind himself at law that any future
event shall happen.' ' 136 Also: "Any present fact which is unknown to the
parties is just as uncertain for the purposes of making an arrangement at this
moment, as any future fact. 137 I.e., Ypromises X: 'Your ship will come in';
but it has already sunk. Most promises differ from this in two respects. They
are broken only intentionally and only after they are made. That is, promise-
136. O.W. HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 299 (1881).
137. Id. at 304.
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breaking is infrequently accidental in the appropriate sense. The con-
tracting situations Enforcing Promises treats are more nearly equivalent to
Poncho deciding to hit Alice, etc., than to Poncho accidentally hitting
Alice-just the situations in which the Hand test does not apply.
Mostly, we use the Hand test to find if a defendant is liable, not how much
he has to pay. The Hand test is about motive, not measure, in the language of
Part IA. The rule requires that Y compensate X for the actual harm he does
(only) if there is net expected harm. Imagine that a doctor administers a
drug knowing, or having reason to know, it will do his patient $500 harm or
$400 good with probabilities of .5. The doctor is negligent according to the
Hand test, but not very negligent: $500 x .5 is more than $400 x .5, but
not a great deal more. If the bad outcome occurs (as it is going to half the
time) the doctor must pay $500. The idea is that, having established the fact
of liability, we want to set the extent of it so that we place the injured party in
as good a position as she would have been if she had not been injured.
If we apply the rule of Enforcing Promises we give her
$500 - (.51(1 - .5))$400: that is, $100.
To perform a Hand test in a context of promising, calculate G, the gain to
the promisor from making the promise (again not from giving what he
promises). The promisor's foregoing G is part of the cost of preventing the
harm. Hold him liable only if the harm discounted by its improbability
((1 - p)R) is greater than the cost of preventing it (pB + G). Promising,
in these circumstances, is the negligent act and liability follows from it if
there is injury, as generally there will be if the promisor breaks the promise.
The rule of Enforcing Promises persuades the promisor to balance
(1 - p)R - pB against G to achieve the same promising activity. A prom-
isor indifferently adds pB to G or subtracts it from (1 - p)R. By the rule of
Enforcing Promises, but not by the Hand test, frequently (i.e., if D is
positive) there is liability if the promise is broken, even if it ought to have
been made. This happens because, despite D's being positive, the promisor
gets offsetting gains. Also, by the Hand test the promisor if liable is required
to pay not R - (p/(1 - p))B as Enforcing Promises has it, but R undis-
counted. Both rules get the number of promises made right. However, the
Hand test does and the rule offered by Enforcing Promises does not-
except where p or B is zero-fully compensate the promisee (if compensat-
ing comes to protecting the reliance interest; but, it comes to at least this;
and, if it comes to more, neither standard compensates).
We can look differently at the difference between what Enforcing Prom-
ises tells us to do and the true analogue to the Hand test. The new
perspective reappears more importantly later. D ought to do two things (at
least). It ought to get the number of promises right. But for the various
reasons that support tort law generally (and because of the historical
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antecendents of the rule of Enforcing Promises in Fuller's Aristotelian
ethical intuitions) it should also putX where she would have been had Y not
promised. Therefore, there are two target variables: n and say c (the ratio of
X's recovery to X's reliance loss, optimally 1). Goetz and Scott provide one
instrument variable (D) to optimize the values of both target variables. In
the ordinary course of things, they can get only n or only c absolutely right
or they can get n and c partly right. This is because an instrument variable
has only one value at a time, but, in general, different values of it optimize
different target variables. Goetz and Scott apply it to satisfy n. But the Hand
test would bifurcate the instrument variable (divorcing the decision to
impose liability from how much liability gets imposed) to apply its parts to
optimize the values of the target variables independently. The Hand test is
distinguishing between what Fuller called 'motive' and 'measure'; but,
here, the context makes this a good thing.
Goetz and Scott started with Fuller, but by now have gotten far from him.
Goetz and Scott want, as Fuller wanted, to protect the reliance interest, but
for different reasons. According to Fuller (following Aristotle), protecting
the reliance interest gives X what Y caused X to lose. This is corrective
justice. According to Goetz and Scott, protecting the reliance interest gets
the number of promises Y makes right. This contributes to efficiently
allocating resources. But then Goetz and Scott omit from their argument the
solicitude for X that is significant for Fuller. Because they protect X's
reliance interest only incidentally, they treat X not as a (Kantian) end, as she
is for Fuller, but as a means. Consequently, the continuity of their analysis
with Fuller's in which Goetz and Scott so rejoice is mostly spurious.
Before Goetz and Scott wrote, we defined the reliance interest as and
measured recovery by detrimental reliance. Postanalytically, what is
changed, is the definition of 'detrimental reliance'. Now we know what it
really is. Goetz and Scott, nevertheless, did not disconnect 'detrimental
reliance' from 'reliance interest'. We expect to go on measuring the reliance
interest by detrimental reliance; it is just that our idea of the latter is
different. However the rule Enforcing Promises advocates does not protect
X's reliance interest as we thus have consistently understood it. Instead, it
protects this interest, diminished by the authors' particular function of X's
beneficial reliance ((p/(1 - p))__). Nothing is, by itself, wrong with argu-
ing this way. The rule of Enforcing Promises does excellent things too. It is
just that they are other things. The difference between being Kantian
(Fuller) and non-Kantian (Goetz and Scott) is a big one.
D.
Getting the correct number of promisesmade is the equivalent in contract
jurisprudence of getting things worked out in a fairy story (princess awake;
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prince not a frog; etc.). The performance part, as Enforcing Promises
portrays it, is analogous to marriage in the story. It is the unexamined telos.
The story concludes, 'and they lived happily ever after'; Goetz and Scott
rather conclude, 'and they lived happily ever after with probability p'. It is
not wholly redemptive that their version, being probabilistic, is less trust-
ing.
We can see something is wrong, if we work out further the examples at
the end of Part IIA. Imagine the probability Y will give X the cake is again
.8. Then D is negative (-$1.20). This does not indicate that the court will
subsidize Y's promising, but just that it will impose no damages. Y may
break his promise with impunity. But we intuit that there should be some
disincentive to his so doing. Again, if R.R. will keep his promise to catch
P.N. with a probability .5, then D is 0. There is no gain to P.N. and, ceteris
paribus, no social gain from R.R. 's promising. After P.N. jumps (relies), it
is important to him and, depending on the social product of acting or
banditry, important to the community that R.R. catch him, although the
rule of Enforcing Promises would not give damages to P.N. 's estate if R.R.
does not. But P.N. 's expectation interest is the value of his life; and he has
relied to the extent of half this.
That is, it matters whether a promise is kept (presuming it has been
made). Whether it is kept depends on the damage rule (p depends on D).
Goetz and Scott recognize this by defining p "under an existing legal rule
calling for damages of D.' 38 I argued a bargained-for promise is kept
when it should be kept and broken when it should be broken if the damage
rule protects the expectation interest because its doing this is economically
efficient. 139 1 will disregard this argument, attending only to promises only
relied on (not bargained for), or accepting, for its heuristic advantage, the
contention of Enforcing Promises that we should not protect the expectation
interest in either bargained-for promises or relied-on promises. If every-
thing goes well, we will end up protecting the expectation interest anyway,
or trying to do so.
Pretend Y has made a (gratuitous) promise to X. By the background
psychological theory, Y will break it just in case he gains by doing this. We
want him to break it just in case society gains. Society gains just in case X
and Y together have a net gain. Relevantly, this happens when Y's gain
offsets X's loss. Imagine we have identified X's loss from Y's breaking his
promise. If we attend only to Y's promise breaking (thus not to his promise
making) we should equate D to this loss to force Y to take it into account as
he calculates what to do. But the character of X's loss is opaque even after
excluding expectancy losses. We narrow it down to something like the
138. Goetz & Scott, supra note 2, at 1281.
139. See supra, Part ID.
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reliance interest by stipulating we will not compare what X would do with
what Y has promised her with what Y would do with it. We nevertheless
identify two candidate rules, starting from different ideas of this loss.
Rule R: Y having breached, we might give X her detrimental reliance, the
difference between where she is now and where she would have been had Y
not promised: R in the notation of Enforcing Promises. It would be
convenient if this were right. The Restatement defines "detrimental
reliance" by this difference. If we are trying to protect the reliance interest,
arguably we should give exactly this difference (R). In the language of Part
IIC and the latter part of this Part, if we do give R, we obtain the value 1 (its
optimal value) for c. But, under arule requiring that Ydo this, seemingly Y
will break promises he should keep.
Rule R + B: We might giveX her detrimental reliance and her beneficial
reliance. This may be read off figure 1 in Part IIA and the following matrix as
the difference between u3 and u1 plus the difference between u4 and u2.
Equivalently, it is the difference between u3 and u2, less the difference
between u and U4. If Y's gain by breaking the promise is greater than R and
less than R + B, a rule using R encourages Y to break his promise while a
rule using R + B encourages Y to keep it. The rules otherwise provide
identical results. So one rule is better than the other, depending on whether
Y ought to keep or break his promise in these circumstances.
Goetz and Scott guide us only uncertainly here. At first we think they
would want Y to break the promise: R is the most Enforcing Promises is
willing to give in any circumstances (and then only ifp or B is zero). But we
do better reading its analysis as supporting the opposite (correct) result. In
telling us how to optimize the number of promises made (n) Goetz and
Scott say beneficial reliance is good and detrimental reliance bad. They
remain respectively good and bad if, instead, we optimize the number of
promises kept. Perhaps we should talk of optimizing p here. Nevertheless,
'p' is not precisely the right variable because it is not constant over promises
and collapses after the fact to 1 or 0. I use 'k' (the number of promises kept).
X's not getting B is a loss to the community in a more attenuated sense than
X's suffering R. But relative to getting B, it is a loss in the broad sense of
'loss', which reports results of comparing sums of satisfactions of individu-
als in different situations.
A rule giving R + B at least does more than protect X's reliance interest
(defined as detrimental reliance). We should, in general, distinguish a
reliance interest from an expectation interest according to this test: some-
thing is a reliance interest if we calculate it against the way things would
have been if Y had not made the promise, an expectation interest if we
calculate it against the way things would have been if Y had kept it. Then the
rule giving R + B gives expectation damages (or part of them). This result
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ought to be mildly embarrassing to a thesis that only the reliance interest
counts, but Goetz and Scott can live with it.
Begin with D, as Goetz and Scott have it, at R - (p/(1 - p))B. If we
increase D slightly, Y will make slightly fewer promises. Nevertheless, he
will keep more of them (p will go up for every promise made). The
consequent gain will exceed the loss unless the dependencies of n and k on
D are pathological. This is because D, being set to get the number of
promises made right, badly underproduces promises kept, so that not just
the promises it is marginally beneficial to keep are broken. In changing D,
we give up made promises barely good enough to encourage anyway
(having G - (1 - p)R + pB close to 0) in exchange for kept promises
having gains approaching G + R less R - (p/(1 - p))B. This is the
amount by which D understates the cost of breaking them. Imagine, in the
last illustration of Part IIA with p = .5, we increase D slightly from
R - (p/(1 - p))B = 0. R.R. might behave differently in either of two
ways. He might be deterred from promising-bad because before we
increased D he was promising optimally. Or, having promised, he might be
deterred from breaking the promise-good because before we increased D
he was performing too infrequently. Neither effect is a priori more probable
than the other. Loss from not making the promise is almost 0, gain from
keeping it close to R + B, the value of P.N. 's life. So it pays to increase D.
Or begin with D at R + B. If we decrease D slightly, Y will make more
promises but keep fewer of them. The promises newly broken are mar-
ginally valuable. But the promises newly made are advantageous ones-
the value of them to the community will approach the difference between
the prospective costs of promising under alternative rules, (1 - p)(R + B)
and (1 - p)R - pB. This is B. Imagine in the last illustration of Part IIA we
decrease D slightly from R + B. R.R., not having promised, might do so
now (good). Or, having promised, he might now break the promise (bad).
Breaking the promise is not all that bad, not because the loss to P.N. is
somehow diminished, but because R.R., having to pay for almost all of it,
will break the promise only if doing so otherwise significantly benefits him.
The good effect is greater than the bad and neither is evidently more
probable. Consequently, it pays to decrease D. I.e., neither optimizing n
nor optimizing k is likely to give a combination of values for both variables
that is best.
In the neighborhood of promising we have three target variables: the
number of promises made (n); the proportion of her loss for which X is
compensated (c); and the number of promises kept (k). Despite this we have
only one instrument variable (D). We know we are not going to get
everything we want, unless fortuitously Enforcing Promises, by setting D
at R - (p/(1 - p))B, gets n right but exhausts D without doing anything
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directly about c or k. We might instead optimize c by setting D at R
(assuming, with Fuller/Aristotle, that awarding detrimental reliance pre-
cisely compensates X). Although doing this has other advantages we will
get to, it correspondingly leaves n and k at risk. Or finally, we might get a
better level of k by setting D at R + B-but at a price of not optimizing n
and c. Evidently, the cost of getting any of n, c, or k right is getting
generally wrong values of the other two.
To start with, we ignore c, partly because we talked about it in Part IIC. A
way to get n and k right together is to introduce a second instrument variable
besides D so there is one for each of these target variables. D is only
awkwardly usable to get the right n, although Goetz and Scott use it only for
this. Using it so makes their formula more interesting by its having D
multiplied by 1 - p. But mainly this shows they are applying the instrument
variable at the wrong time: at the time of making, not at the time of
breaking, the promise. D is aesthetically and pragmatically suited to control
k because we apply it only when Ybreaks his promise. Therefore, we first set
D at R + B to get k right, and then consider what we have to do to get n
right, too.
We will do whatever else we decide to do at the point a promise is being
made or not. At this point Y should, as Goetz and Scott say, be looking at a
gain from promising that is independent of the legal rule, reduced by the
law-imposed expected cost (1 - p)R - pB, so he will consider the con-
sequences to X. If we have already set D to optimize k, this prelegal gain is
instead reduced by (1 - p)(R + B). That is, what Ypays, if he breaks the
promise, multiplied by the probability he will break it. So we should
subsidize Y's promising by paying Y, if he does promise, the difference
between these quantities, that is, (1 - p)(R + B) less (1 - p)R - pB.
This works out to B. Subsequently, we ought to do nothing, if Y keeps his
promise. But if he breaks it, we ought to take R + B from him. Y should do
the right thing both times then: promise if he should and keep his promises
if he should.
Intuitively, we start out supposing (acting as if we suppose) Y will keep
his promise if he makes it (p = 1). To get him to make it in exactly the
cases he should, we pay him for the benefit (B) conferred on others (X) by
his having made it. Subsequently, to get him to keep it in exactly the cases
he should, we take from him, if he breaks it (p = 0), the loss (R + B) to
others (X) of his breaking it.
A difficulty is that we are incurring a deficit. We (the nonparties) are
paying out B to Y and taking in nothing. On the other hand, X obtains
R + B if Y breaks the promise. All we are trying to accomplish for X is to
make her as well off as she would have been if Y had not promised; we can
do this by setting damages at just R. We are less interested in giving B to X
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than we are in taking it from Y. We therefore might partly fund the subsidy
(to the extent of (1 - p)B) by diverting to it the B part of what otherwise
would be X's damages. Our doing this still would give the optimal value (1)
for c so X is not left badly off (assuming again X's recovering detrimental
reliance exactly compensates X).
Subsidizing is a bad idea because it is a great nuisance (i.e., transaction
costs are high). The picture is Kafkaesque. We imagine a bureau of prom-
ises. A potential promisor submits a possible promise to it. A functionary
calculates the subsidy B for this promise. Depending on B and G the
potential promisor promises and is subsidized or does not promise and is
not subsidized. There are two major problems: (1) only part of the cost of
subsidizing will be collected in damages and (2) X's beneficial reliance is
difficult to calculate. It is not even as if we could find this out by asking X,
because there would be motive for her to collude with Y to inflate B. I let the
inconvenience or impossibility of subsidizing sink in while exploring an
alternative to it.
Imagine, then, we have only one instrument variable, i.e., all we can do is
manipulate D. Then we locate D somewhere between R - (p/(1 - p))B and
R + B: we take a linear combination of the rule that optimizes n and the
rule that optimizes k. With a not less than 0 nor greater than 1, we set:
D = a(R - (p/(1 - p))B) + (1 - a)(R + B).
The best a will not be 1 (its being 1 would give us the rule Goetz and Scott
advocate which gets n right but costs too much in k). Identically, it will not
be 0 (this would give too few promises made). However, we do not have a
convenient way to find out just where between 0 and 1 it is. Bernoulli's
principle of insufficient reason (which is not the best principle in the world
but may be the only principle we can grab onto here) tells us that if we do
not know which of two outcomes will be realized, we should assign each a
probability of .5.140 If we are ignorant about Y's promise-keeping we might
setp at .5. Then we might set D at R because this is intermediate between
R - B, which we get if a is 1, and R + B, which we get if a is 0. To do
this, we set a at .5, which is also applying Bernoulli's principle, albeit
probably even less justifiably than usual. A nice thing about this result is
that it optimizes c (again assume compensating is giving detrimental
reliance). This is being as elegant as we can be, but still is merely making
the best of a bad thing.
Goetz's and Scott's analysis does not apply well to relied-on promises
that are not bargained for (i.e., gratuitous promises: Goetz's and Scott's
140. R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY 284-86
(1957).
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paradigmatic case). Y is hypothetically thinking about promising to give X
something. And by manipulating D we are trying to induce him to promise
optimally frequently. Given Y's promise is not going to be bargained for, Y
must be well-disposed to X before the law operates on him. D functions by
taking something from Y and giving it to X. This is just what Y will have
decided to do anyway, if he promises. Then, increasing D should not have its
ordinary effect, or not so much of it. Y might reduce the magnitude of his
promises, not their number. Anyway we should not expect Y to feel very bad
if he is made to give X more. There is incongruity because, according to
Goetz and Scott, the law comes into play only if Y's promising hurts X on
balance; and Y is often X's friend.
Also, we may count X's interest twice. Y probably has a lot of reasons to
promise to give something to X, but the best or most ordinary is that X's
satisfaction matters to Y. That is, Y's utility function depends onX's. Maybe
we do not want to get Y to internalize X's satisfaction again by forcing him
to figure in damages to X consequent on Y's breaking the promise. One
responds: Y's happiness, caused by X's happiness, is a social gain separate
from X's happiness; also, Y already is interested in X's happiness and,
consequently, is (somewhat) happy to pay damages to X. However, by
including vicarious utility in the calculus, we get rapidly away from the
ostensibly sensible framework we started with. So, if X likes Y too, Y's
satisfaction is a function of X's satisfaction, which is a function of Y's
satisfaction, etc. We could build up pretty high levels of satisfaction going
on this way. Also, supposing Y's satisfaction varies inversely, rather than
directly, with X's, what we should do is obscure. E.g., we might offset the
harm of a maliciously made promise by the satisfaction of the promisor in
breaking it. But it is not at all clear we want to do this.
Be this as it may, this response probably does not go as deeply as the
trouble, which is really with the presupposed psychological theory-
psychological egoism141-according to which it is incoherent to think that
Y can consider X's satisfaction without having this reflected in his own. By
the theory, plausibly Y has an "interested but unselfish concern for the
condition of" somebody; however, he must lack "a strictly disinterested
concern." 142 We ask whether Y might conceivably act in X's behalf without
satisfaction or the prospect of satisfaction for himself from doing this.
Probably he can. We imagine judges for whatever reasons (for the satisfac-
tion of judging well) adjudicate disinterestedly. Or we construct liability
rules disinterestedly. If we maximize satisfaction tautologously, Poncho can
141. See, e.g., Feinberg, Psychological Egoism, in REASON AND RESPONSIBILITY 498 (4th ed. J.
Feinberg 1978).
142. N. RESCHER, UNSELFISHNESS: THE ROLE OF THE VIcARIOUS AFFEcrs IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
AND SOCIAL THEORY 9 (1975).
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become liable under the Hand test (if he knows about it) only by calculating
badly, not by disregarding Alice's well-being.
The analysis of Enforcing Promises arguably is inapplicable to promises
bargained for. If we raise D, we increase the expense to Y of breaking the
promise. Simultaneously, however, we increase the value of his breaking it
to X by the same amount (in dollars). Therefore, Y can charge that much
more (discounted by the improbability of breach) for the promise. Then,
manipulating D gets us nowhere. This is the result of X and Y assigning
identical probabilities to Y's breaking his promise. If the probability Y
assigns is higher, raising D discourages promising (then Y cannot recover
completely his expected added cost); if the probability Y assigns is lower,
raising D encourages promising (Y can recover more than his expected
added cost). But these are weak and irregular effects to have a rule of
damages turn on.
We left promises only relied on in bad shape. If we did not subsidize
making them, we had too few made or too few kept (or both). And
subsidizing them is not remotely practical. But thinking about promises
bargained for tells us what to do. That is, the promisee is going to benefit by
B if the promise is made and is, as well, the only person who has a good idea
what B is. So she ought to provide the incentive to promising. Put dif-
ferently, X, if she wants a promise that Y would not make otherwise, ought
just to buy it by paying B to Y, or by paying something less than B that still
exceeds Y's cost of promising. We can get the right promises made without
allocating to Y all the gain from them. X's doing this transforms Y's
otherwise gratuitous promise into a bargained-for promise. We reinvent
contract law (after a fashion). If we simply extrapolate from where Goetz
and Scott have taken us, we reapproach the law as it was when they began to
criticize it.
D = B + R, which is still the right rule, gives expectation damages
manqu6. We conclude close to Anglia Television Ltd. v. Reed, discussed in
Part IB.14 3 What is missing (again in terms of figure 1) is the difference
between u1 and u4 , which may be 0, as in the last illustration of Part IIA.
There P.N. expects to live and, if R.R. breaks his promise, is going to die. B
and R are each worth a probability of .5 of living. B + R falls short of
expectation damages if the promisor is giving something independently of
the promise (e.g., a cake). To this extent, D-defined B + R-protects
the expectation interest in promising, instead of performing. The 'reliance'
in 'beneficial reliance' is misleading, in that we are trained to contrast it
with 'expectation'. Nevertheless, the controlling idea is that the promisee
143. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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expects the benefit, albeit she has acted in reliance to put herself in the
position to receive that benefit.
III. CONCLUSION
I have taken Goetz and Scott to argue for C: Only the reliance interest
counts. I have been arguingfrom A/B: The expectation interest counts tool
only. From this perspective what Fuller did best was open things up. And
what Goetz and Scott do best is define 'detrimental reliance'. Simplified, A
goes like this: there are two kinds of contracts: bargained-for and merely
relied-on promises (Restatement view). We protect the expectation and
reliance interests in them respectively. B has two plausible readings: B1.
Bargained-for and relied-on promises are contracts, but we protect the
expectation interest of both (first Restatement view). B2. Bargained-for
promises are treated as in B1. Relied-on promises are not contracts but
potential torts; if broken, we give reliance damages.
Bl is as bad as C is in the other direction. B2 differs from A by how we
define 'contract' and has the advantage of not being hubristic. Being
hubristic gets one into trouble. Croesus asked the oracle of Apollo at Delphi
what would happen if he attacked Persia, and got back the answer he would
destroy a great empire.144 He learned later it would be his own. Gilmore
talks impressively about contract being absorbed by tort. "We are told that
Contract, like God, is dead. And so it is."1 45 Contract would appear more
obviously alive (but less imperialistic) if we would define it in terms of the
expectation interest and leave relied-on promises alone.
144. HERoDoTus, THE HisToRIEs 60 (Revised A. Selincourt trans. 1972).
145. G. GiLMoRE, supra note 4, at 3.
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Glossary of Terms
Theses
A The expectation interest counts too.
B Only the expectation interest counts.
B1  Bargained-for and relied-on promises are contracts, but we protect the
expectation interest of both (first Restatement view).
B2  Bargained-for promises are treated as in B . Relied-on promises are not
contracts but potential torts; if broken, we give reliance damages.
C Only the reliance interest counts.
Symbols
a a number between 0 and I inclusive, weighting the rules (formulae) that
optimize n and k
B gross beneficial reliance; the difference to the promisee between perfor-
mance and promise + performance
c the proportion of her loss due to the promisor's breach for which the
promisee is compensated
D damages for breach of contract
G the promisor's gain from promising
k the number of promises kept
n the number of promises made
p the probability the promisor will keep his promise
I-p the probability the promisor will break his promise
R gross detrimental reliance; the difference to the promisee between nonper-
formance and promise + nonperformance
u utility
X the promisee (pronoun: 'she')
Y the promisor (pronoun: 'he')
NBR net beneficial reliance (pB - (I - p)R)
NDR net detrimental reliance ((1 - p) R - pB)
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